The crimes of Suharto

September 18, 1996
Issue 

By James Balowski

Despite the ongoing crackdown against PRD (People's Democratic Party) members and other pro-democracy activists, when John Howard meets with President Suharto this week, you can be sure that promoting Australian business interests will be his primary concern. "Money" will certainly be high on the agenda this week — "blood" will not."Blood and money", however, is a particularly accurate characterisation of Suharto's Indonesia.

The Suharto government invaded East Timor on December 7, 1975. Thousands of East Timorese, mainly civilians, were killed. More than 200,000, almost one third of the population, died in the ensuing years from Indonesian military activity and disruption to agriculture. Arrest, torture and murder of independence activists have continued, as in the Santa Cruz massacre in Dili on November 11, 1991, when 270 people were killed. Many forget, however — or have chosen to ignore — that Suharto's rise to power was accomplished at the cost of many more lives.

By late 1965, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), had become the largest Communist party outside of the Soviet Union and China, with a membership of over 3.5 million and an affiliated membership of some 10 million. Trade unions, women's, artists and peasant organisations were all experiencing a spectacular rate of growth.

It was in this context that on the night of September 30, 1965, a group of middle ranking left-wing military officers kidnapped and murdered six generals whom they accused of being members of a "Council of Generals" organising a coup against the then president of Indonesia, Sukarno.

Organised slaughter

Blaming the kidnappings on the PKI and referring to the incident as an attempt to overthrow the government, Suharto and right-wing military officers were able to launch a bloody counter-revolution which has been described as one of the most organised slaughters in modern history. Within four months, as many as 1 million people were killed, and hundreds of thousands of others were interned for long periods.

According to New Order mythology — which even to this day is parroted by western supporters of the regime — the massacres were a "spontaneous" expression of popular anger at the PKI. Although some aspects of the supposed coup remain unclear, most research suggests that the PKI was not directly involved; rather it was an internal army affair of which Suharto had prior knowledge and may even have been directly involved.

Within days, military-backed Muslims and students were mobilised against the PKI, and the military began training and arming Muslim gangs. Having seized the national radio station and closed down most of the country's newspapers, Suharto was in a position to manipulate the events for his own interests — to overthrow Sukarno and obliterate the PKI.

Not just members of the PKI were targeted, but worker and peasant leaders, writers, intellectuals, left-wing teachers and students — in fact the whole Indonesian left.

It was also a campaign of terror. There were public executions and torture, with victims being disembowelled and left to die — designed to terrorise the population into submission. A massive purge was also carried out against Communist "suspects" in the ministries, the armed forces, the press and any enterprises playing a vital part in the economy.

In its sheer scope, speed and ferocity, there have been few historical precedents. Bertrand Russell wrote in response to the events: "... in four months, five times as many people died in Indonesia as in Vietnam in twelve years".

Time magazine carried the following report on December 17, 1966: "Communists, red sympathizers and their families are being massacred by the thousands. Backlands army units are reported to have executed thousands of communists after interrogation in remote jails. Armed with wide-bladed knives called parangs, Moslem bands crept at night into the homes of communists, killing entire families and burying their bodies in shallow graves. The murder campaign became so brazen in parts of rural East Java, that Moslem bands placed the heads of victims on poles and paraded them through villages. The killings have been on such a scale that the disposal of the corpses has created a serious sanitation problem in East Java and Northern Sumatra, where the humid air bears the reek of decaying flesh. Travelers from those areas tell of small rivers and streams that have been literally clogged with bodies."

Most western governments, and the US in particular, were openly supportive. Time, for example, carried an article titled, "The West's best news for years in Asia". Max Frankel in an article in the New York Times in March 1966 described the Johnson administration's delight with the situation and noted that Washington's expectations were finally being realised. US Secretary of State Robert McNamara, before the Senate Foreign Relations, described the elimination of the PKI as "... a hopeful augury of a period in which democratic aspirations will regain ascendancy over an exacerbated nationalism".

Tanjung Priok

Although killings on the scale of 1965 have not been repeated, violence against those exercising their fundamental rights to freedom, assembly, association and religion have continued to be a feature of the Suharto regime. Not unlike the Santa Cruz massacre, the regime has also sought to legitimise the use of violence by trying the survivors of massacres while the perpetrators, usually the military, are deemed to have acted in the interests of "national security".

Even in rare cases when international pressure has forced the regime to try military officers accused of such killings — as in the case of Santa Cruz — they have received only minor reprimands or light sentences.

On September 12, 1984, dozens of people were killed and injured when troops fired on Muslim demonstrators in the port district of Tanjung Priok, in north Jakarta. This was the climax of a series of incidents which began on September 7, when a sermon at a local mosque condemned government policy. Leaflets were also distributed and anti-government slogans painted on walls. Police retreated from a confrontation with an angry crowed, but returned later and arrested four people.

On September 12, a well-respected Muslim leader, Amir Biki, set up a street podium, repeating the criticisms before a large crowd and demanding the release of the four detainees. The authorities ignored requests for their release, and by evening a huge crowd had gathered and marched to the police station where their colleagues were being held.

Eyewitness reports say that the demonstrators were stopped before they reached the police office by a company of air artillery troops which had barracks in the area, and three truck loads of soldiers with automatic weapons. Without warning, troops began firing directly into the crowd. Some of the injured who rose to their feet were killed by bayonets, and bystanders who tried to help the injured were also shot.

Soon after the massacre, army trucks arrived to haul off the bodies, the injured being taken to the Jakarta Army Hospital — other hospitals were instructed not to accept casualties. Fire engines arrived soon afterwards to wash away the blood. Since all of the killed and wounded were taken away by the military, the exact number of victims is still unknown. The most comprehensive report, compiled by the Al Araf Mosque, put the number at 63, with more than 100 seriously wounded.

The following day, the armed forces chief, General Benny Murdani, summoned editors of all the Jakarta newspapers to give his version of events. Admitting that troops had fired "in the direction of the mob", he claimed that only nine people had died and 53 had been injured. Most reports in the Indonesian press supported Murdani's version of events.

In October, a spate of bombings and fires rocked Jakarta which many believed were motivated by widespread anger at Murdani's statements. The targets of the bombings and fires were businesses owned either by long-term business partners of Suharto, such as Liem Sioe Liong, or members of his family. Nine people were later tried and given heavy sentences for the bombings.

In April 1985, sentences of one to three years were passed against 28 people accused of participating in the Tanjung Priok demonstrations and who were charged with "waging resistance with violence" against the armed forces. Many of the accused were seriously wounded, some crippled for life, and calls for a public inquiry were ignored.

Lampung

As many as 100 people were killed on February 7, 1989, when troops surrounded the hamlet of Talangsari, in Lampung, South Sumatra, opening fire at the villages and setting fire to homes. Officials immediately imposed a clampdown on information and closed off the area.

Only one journalist, an Asiaweek correspondent, succeeded in getting close to the village. In the February 24 issue of the magazine, she wrote: "This week Talangsari lay in ruins. A child's foot poked out from under the ashes of what was once a house. This and eleven other piles of ashes and scorched beams are nearly all that remained of the hamlet of 300 people."

According to the official version, released on February 9, only 27 people were killed, and troops were brought in only after an unsuccessful attempt to summon the leader of a "deviant" Muslim group. It was alleged that when a group of officers drove to the hamlet, they were met with poisoned arrows and had to retreat, leaving one officer behind, badly wounded. The next day troops were sent in to retrieve the body of the officer, who was by then dead, and again came under attack and "a close-range battle was unavoidable".

According to other sources, however, the incident erupted after several people were arrested and tortured by the military in early January. Villagers retaliated by ambushing the officer responsible, taking him hostage and offering his release in exchange for their detained colleagues. Three days later, troops from the elite corps Kopassus, which is also used in East Timor and now receives training in Australia, attacked the village.

The real reason behind the tensions in the region was never acknowledged by the government. Since 1977, residents in the area have been under pressure to make way for a reforestation project. In January 1988, the inhabitants were told they must leave the area. No compensation was offered. Residents believed that "reforestation" was an excuse to clear the land for speculators. One of the companies granted permission to implement the reforestation program was PT Citra Lamtoro-gung, owned by Suharto's oldest daughter, Tutut.

Between November 19 and December 7, 1988, 476 houses were burned down in more than a dozen villages. In other incidents, crops were burned, rice stocks and other foodstuffs destroyed, vehicles smashed and money extorted from inhabitants. Calls for an independent inquiry by legal and human rights groups were ignored, and scores of villagers were later tried for subversion and received long jail sentences.

More recently, peasants resisting land evictions have been killed by the military. In July 1993, two Muslim scholars were shot dead and a number of others badly wounded when police attack another alleged "religious sect" in Haur Koneng, West Java. In September 1993, four people were killed by troops in Nipah, on the island of Madura, where they were demonstrating against land being cleared for a dam project.

Petrus

In early 1983, bodies riddled with bullets began to appear in the streets of Yogyakarta, Central Java. The so-called "mysterious shootings" or petrus, soon spread to Jakarta and other major cities in Java and Sumatra. Although it was well known that the killings were being carried out by a paracommando unit, then called Kopassandha, at the time Suharto publicly denied military involvement. General Murdani claimed the deaths were a result of "inter-gang warfare".

Most of the victims were "petty criminals" killed soon after release from jail. The director of the Cipinang Prison stated that 95% of the Jakarta victims were people who had been released from prison, often only two or three days before. Prisoners became so fearful that some pleaded to be allowed to stay past their term. Others committed crimes the moment they got out so as to be rearrested. Thousands of others fled to mountain villages and were forced to beg for food. Although authorities initially tried to round them up, eventually they stopped, one officer saying: "Just let them die of hunger".

Then in June, Murdani publicly acknowledged that the killings were a national campaign to "combat crime", saying it was "good" because Indonesia is promoting tourism and it makes Indonesia a safe country. The following month Ali Murtopo (who organised the invasion of East Timor) said that the killings were ordered by the government because "conventional methods to combat crime have proved inappropriate in Indonesia".

Although exact figures on the number killed are uncertain, one Indonesian journalist who had been monitoring the killings calculated that by the end of 1983, 8500 people had been murdered in East Java alone. In Yogyakarta, bodies were dumped in wells leading to tunnels which go out to the ocean. Witnesses in Central Java said that they had seen army trucks arrive twice weekly to dump in caves bodies which they believed were being brought from Central as well as East Java.

In his 1989 autobiography, Suharto confirmed that he had personally authorised the killings, giving orders to "shoot to kill", saying that "we needed to have our own treatment, firm measures" and that it was done "for the purpose of shock therapy".

In 1994 another wave of petrus occurred, this time far more blatantly: unlike the '80s, uniformed officers carried out the shootings in Jakarta. According to police, around 24 people were shot in the first two months of 1994.

Police claimed that those killed were trying to escape or resisting arrest. Around 60 to 70 were shot, often repeatedly in the legs. There were 74 shot in North Sumatra, with eight dead. Armed forces chief Faisal Tanjung said that if "bandits" didn't heed the first warning, "There is nothing left but to exterminate them".

Aceh

Although the military suppression of national liberations struggles in East Timor and West Papua is well known, equally violent incidents have occurred in the province of Aceh, North Sumatra. Designated as a "semi-autonomous zone", the region is devoutly Muslim, rich in oil, minerals and timber, and has a long history of economic exploitation by Jakarta.

Popular sentiment for Aceh to secede from Indonesia has become widespread in recent years, leading to a number of armed clashes between Indonesian troops and what the government terms "security disturbance gangs" (GPK).

In a 1992 report, the US-based human rights organisation Asia Watch stated: "... as many as 1000 may have died since mid-1989 in a combination of separatist guerrilla attacks and army reprisals. Disappearances remain unresolved, suspected guerrillas continue to be shot on the spot rather than taken into custody, large numbers of people are believed to remain in unacknowledged detention and trials which violate international norms of fairness continued to take place."

Other sources have put the number of deaths at more than 2000, with hundreds being tried and jailed as alleged members of the GPK. Since open conflict broke out in the late 1980s, Indonesia has consistently refused to allow international human rights organisations into the region. Even the International Red Cross has been denied access.
[James Balowski is the national deputy coordinator of ASIET and worked at the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (LBH) as documentation officer from 1993 to 1995.]

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