Pedro S谩nchez, prime minister of Spain鈥檚 minority Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) government, announced on February 15 that the country would vote on April 28.
This election comes 15 months short of a full term and only nine months after the previous People鈥檚 Party (PP) government of Mariano Rajoy fell to a PSOE censure motion, supported by the rest of the all-Spanish left and by nearly all nationalist forces, left and right.
Once in government, S谩nchez, with only 84 PSOE seats in the 350-seat Congress, had to negotiate support for legislation bill by bill. Nonetheless, he had been saying that his government would run its full term. Why did he change his mind?
The trigger was the February 13 vote against the budget by the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and the Catalan European Democratic Party (PDECat). This budget, negotiated with the more radical Unidos Podemos, was promoted as 鈥渢he most social in Spanish history鈥.
It contained numerous positive measures and confronted the Catalan independentism鈥檚 rival parties with a dilemma: Would they join with the PP and the 鈥渃ool right鈥 Citizens in voting it down, on the grounds they had won nothing in negotiations over a Scottish-style referendum? Or would they vote in favour to avoid early elections?聽
The opposition risked that the right, now including the neo-Francoist Vox, might repeat their win in the December regional elections in Andalusia and then move to permanently suspend Catalan self-rule under article 155 of the Spanish constitution.
In that case, the Catalan parties would also have to wear PSOE demagogy about 鈥渢he nationalists鈥 putting their 鈥渘arrow鈥 interests before the well-being of all Spaniards, especially workers and people on welfare.
The ERC and PDECat Congress caucuses were anxious to back the budget, but their vote depended on getting some offer that would be seen as a step forward by the independence movement.
Deeply angered by the present trial of its leaders in the Supreme Court, this movement can鈥檛 forget that the PSOE supported Rajoy鈥檚 article 155 operation against Catalan self-rule. It also retains an enormous power of mobilisation, seen once again in a massive protest in Barcelona on February 16.
Designed to fail?
The offer the S谩nchez government made the Catalan administration of president Quim Torra was for a party-to-party and government-to-government dialogue, minuted by a 鈥渞apporteur鈥.
However, the two sides differed as to what it meant even as their negotiators strove to concretise it; it infuriated Spanish unitarianism, including its wing within the PSOE; and it increased suspicions within independentism that Torra might be getting sucked towards surrendering the right to self-determination.
Notwithstanding, authoritative figures, such as former Catalan premier Artur Mas and former treasurer Andreu Mas-Colell, came out strongly in favour of Catalan support for S谩nchez鈥檚 budget.
After it was voted down, Mas-Colell wrote: 鈥淭he PNV voted in favour. Its MP Aitor Esteban spelled out that he didn鈥檛 see what the advantage could be for Catalonia in voting against. He was right. The most plausible explanation of what we鈥檝e done is, simply, that we don鈥檛 know how to stop.鈥
Panic or plan?
Did the Catalan Congress MPs shoot themselves in the foot for fear of being regarded as traitors back home, or had they deliberately been made an offer they had to reject?
On February 6, negotiators agreed that the Spanish government would search for candidates for rapporteur while their Catalan counterparts would sketch out how the negotiating forums should function.
The next day, however, the Catalans were presented with a sign-it-or-leave-it document that bore little relation to this agenda: the already weak references to a Catalan right to decide vanished, as did the figure of the rapporteur.
Accounts differ as to what had made S谩nchez change tack. One version is that he was afraid that a February 9 PP-Citizens-Vox demonstration in Madrid would be huge and that the PSOE regional leaders (鈥渂arons鈥) who had organised his beheading as leader in 2016 were once again on the warpath.
The other is that the decision to break off negotiations was already in the pipeline: concerned about a possible economic downturn and buoyed by internal polling predicting a PSOE victory if he ended negotiations, S谩nchez acted to provoke ERC-PDECat rejection.
Whatever the truth and despite last-minute solo rescue attempts by Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias, the government announced the negotiations over and PDECat joined the ERC in opposing the budget.
A nettle grasped
S谩nchez now had to choose between governing with Rajoy鈥檚 budget or calling the early poll that Citizens and the PP were demanding. Why did he choose the latter?
The S谩nchez government faces enemies on four fronts. The most important is the movement for Catalan sovereignty. If he can get it to 鈥渞ealise that independence is impossible鈥 or have it lose the next Catalan elections, he will become the hero of the Spanish and European establishments.
So burning is this issue that a victory would strengthen S谩nchez on his other fronts: rival Podemos would see an important point of difference with the PSOE 鈥 the right to national self-determination 鈥攆ade in importance; the various 鈥渇inal solutions鈥 of the right to the Catalan rebellion would become irrelevant; and the PSOE barons and former leaders like Felipe Gonz谩lez would be forever discredited.
But the causality also runs the other way. To crack the 80% support for self-determination in Catalonia 鈥 getting a majority to accept that the best they can expect is a new statute of autonomy 鈥 S谩nchez must first strengthen his position against Unidos Podemos, his barons and the right.
In this situation, an election campaign run as a crusade against the anti-social and centralist right wing in the name of an 鈥渋nclusive鈥 and 鈥渟ocially just鈥 Spain would seize the initiative and also be a powerful weapon against Catalan independentism.
Other factors that would have convinced S谩nchez to go early were failure of the right鈥檚 feared mega-demonstration (only 45,000 attended), polling showing that a majority in Spain want to see the Catalan issue solved by negotiation and the chance to push the Catalan leaders鈥 trial off the front page.
S谩nchez鈥檚 appearance announcing the election was thus a campaign launch. He proclaimed:
鈥淚t is obvious that the right wing, with its three parties, defends a sort of Spain in which not many fit, in which they alone fit. We defend a different sort of Spain, an inclusive Spain, a Spain where all men and women fit. [鈥 Do we want a constitutional Spain, proud of its rights, its freedoms, that makes the transformations needed to conquer its future, or one that lives on longing for a past that will never return?鈥
Win for S谩nchez...
The biggest losers from S谩nchez鈥檚 move for the April 28 general election 鈥 coming before May 26 European, regional and council polls 鈥 will be his PSOE rivals. The barons, led by former Andalusia premier Susana D铆az, will find their candidates replaced by S谩nchez loyalists for the Spanish and European contests, in turn increasing the pressure on their local fiefdoms.
The next advantage is over the forces to the PSOE鈥檚 left: in the 2015 and 2016 general elections it headed off Unidos Podemos and its allies only narrowly (in the 20%-22.5% band); recent polls show the PSOE leading on average by 24.4% to 15% (102 seats to 43, due to Spain鈥檚 rigged electoral system).
Moreover, divisions within Podemos 鈥 most importantly the decision of I帽igo Errej贸n, its lead candidate for the Madrid region, to drop Podemos in favour of an alliance with Madrid mayor Manuela Carmena 鈥 will make it harder to build the enthusiasm of past election campaigns.
If Unidos Podemos maintains its increasingly distant second place behind the PSOE, its proposal for a referendum in Catalonia will never see the light of day. The Iglesias leadership is also showing growing signs of settling for a junior role in any PSOE administration.
...without victory?
With his left flank apparently secured, S谩nchez is freer to carry out the fight against the right, chiefly Citizens. He has been helped by Citizens鈥 February 18 decision 鈥 taken as it fights the PP for hegemony over the right 鈥 to rule out coalitions with the PSOE.
The election campaign dynamic will also help; as the PP, Vox and Citizens contend for the prize of best scourge of the Catalans, repelled voters will turn towards the PSOE. The PP鈥檚 tricky job of doublespeak 鈥 trying to seduce the centre and win back the neo-Francoist right lost to Vox 鈥 will also favour the PSOE.
None of these advantages, however, will guarantee a victory: that will depend on the overall left and nationalist vote surpassing that of the 鈥渢riple-headed monster鈥 of the right.
A right victory would not just produce another Rajoy-style corrupt, anti-worker administration but one of black reaction 鈥 a disaster for working people, the poor, women, refugees and Spain鈥檚 oppressed nations.
It will only be blocked if enough young people are inspired to vote on April 28. The result will depend on those most revolted by the racism and anti-feminism of Vox, the corruption of the PP, and the social regressiveness and virulent centralism of the whole right.
If high participation by younger people helps carry a victory for the left, it will also weaken that part of it that S谩nchez represents 鈥 anti-democratic 鈥渃onstitutionalism鈥 鈥 and strengthen Spain鈥檚 forces of democratic renewal.
[Written with help from Julian Coppens. Dick Nichols is 91自拍论坛 Weekly鈥檚 European correspondent, based in Barcelona. A more detailed version of this article will appear on the web site of International Journal of Socialist Renewal.