By Matthew Beager and Bruce Marlowe
The South Australian food poisoning tragedy follows food safety cuts by Liberal state governments. But these cuts have developed alongside federal Labor government attacks on quarantine and food inspection services.
Standards for export meat inspection are set by US, Japanese, European Community and other importers' requirements. These standards are higher than those for domestic meat, which are set by state laws.
This sets up the potential for beef rejected for export to be redirected into the domestic market. The Community and Public Sector Union claims that it has evidence that meat with up to 12 times the allowable limit for pesticide levels has been put into the local market.
CPSU national officer Don Ford has said that if the federal government offered indemnity to the union's members, they would ensure "that there is a procession of veterinary officers and food standards officers" giving evidence to the Senate inquiry into the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS).
The area has long been home to scandals. An early 1980s Victorian food poisoning outbreak and a kangaroo for beef substitution racket led to a 1982 royal commission. In 1986 AQIS was formed; it received a boost in funding following the 1987 chemical residues crisis, which threatened Australia's meat export trade to the USA.
However, the federal government soon had AQIS in its sights. A November 1991 speech by primary industries minister Alan Griffiths (later of sandwich shop fame) stated, "AQIS is very much part of the government's agenda for micro-economic reform".
One attack was "user pays". The inspection service moved to full cost recovery in January 1991; this allowed the government to claim that "industry" no longer wanted the same level of inspection. As well, "quality assurance" was progressively introduced from 1990. Under this program, government inspection services were replaced by industry self-regulation and random inspections.
In 1991 Griffiths predicted that the inspection work force would decline by about 25% in the following two to three years: the number of AQIS inspection staff had already declined from about 2250 to below 1650 during a rise in production.
An August 1993 budget paper from new primary industry minister Simon Crean promised a "reduction in AQIS costs to industry ... The organisation will be restructured over the next four years as we develop the thrust to Quality Assurance ... Industry will benefit by more than $10 million from this initiative, with the biggest benefits going to the most efficient operators."
Reminiscent of the Liberals' Fightback promise, this saving would come at the expense of jobs: "AQIS is already implementing $20 million of staff and administrative reductions ... This is on top of substantial reductions in staff (over 500) during the past three years."
Around this period, the Labor government oversaw the replacement of senior staff in both the DPIE and AQIS, bringing in staff with a proven capacity to slash costs without knowledge of or regard for services.
The August 1993 budget laid the basis for the current crisis in the department. This crisis has been reflected in its extremely damaging advice on woodchip licences, the meat export problems and the latest meat inspection scandal. Not surprisingly, Crean quit the department as soon as he could, handing the mess to newcomer Bob Collins.
The Labor cuts to AQIS funding were accompanied by Liberal harassment of the agency's expenditure on overseas travel. This was meant to discredit the entire existence of public inspection services. The current Senate inquiry was meant to continue this process. The meat poisoning issue, however, has raised public awareness of the value of inspection services.
In March 1994 Collins described the cuts as "vital to Australia's international trading competitiveness and our economic health". The government looked to agency bargaining to destroy existing jobs and conditions. The result of this process is still in the balance.
The new structure of AQIS central office took effect on 1 July 1994, accompanied by a large number of "voluntary" redundancies. According to several AQIS staff, senior management failed to provide any evidence that the new structure would meet the organisation's requirements. The recruiting of senior managers meant that the new structure was headed by people with little knowledge of the functions of AQIS.
The new structure failed to address any emergency requirements which could arise. The history of quarantine and food inspection has been one of trying to respond to such crises. Lack of animal feed due to drought was just such a crisis. This created a requirement for Australia to import huge volumes of grain for feed stock. AQIS lacked the staff needed to approve these imports.
This lack of staff also contributed to the pesticide residue scare after cattle were fed on contaminated cotton waste, and the subsequent loss of a large part of Australia's meat market for several weeks.
The government's massive cuts to national inspection services have led the way to the present crisis. The Victorian and South Australian governments excluded AQIS from domestic meat inspection in July and December 1994 respectively. In doing this, they joined federal Labor in showing greater concern for profits or "economic health" than for human health.