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Greece's Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) dramatically increased its vote in Greece's May 6 elections, to take second place on a clear platform of rejecting the savage austerity measures that seek to make Greek people pay for the capitalist crisis. Some polls show SYRIZA a clear first in the new June 17 elections, called after no party was able to form government.

The rise of SYRIZA has changed the political landscape of Europe. Michalis Spourdalakis, professor of political science at Athens University, talked to New Left Project's Alex Doherty about SYRIZA and the prospects for the radical left in Greece and beyond. It is abridged from .

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Some mainstream commentators have claimed the rise SYRIZA's support is part of a generalised protest vote against the political mainstream rather than an enthusiastic embrace of their political and economic program.

A good part of the electoral gain of SYRIZA was the result of social anger arising from the austerity programs. The protest vote was the determinant factor in the elections.

However, given the large number of options open to the electorate with the creation of a number of new political formations and parties, one can reasonably assume that the vote for SYRIZA was not simply a protest vote.

SYRIZA, a political coalition of the radical left, which was established in 2004, has had a long presence in the social and political struggles of the country.

It is a political formation composed of 11 different political parties and groups, in which the Synaspismos (Coalition) of the Left and the Ecology and Social Movements (SYN), accounts for about 85%. Its political orientation, strategy and practice is socio-centric.

SYRIZA has been actively involved in the labour movement, both in the conformist confederations and at the grassroots level of the radical new unions of precarious labour, in the civil and social rights movements, as well as in the European and World Social Forums.

So, given the political profile of SYRIZA, it would be rather unfair to say the people who supported it did so simply as a result of anger or mere discontent as it is conditioned by the current conjuncture.

At the same time, on the key axis of current Greek society and politics, i.e. the Memorundum signed with the International Monetary Fund and European Union, one has to stress that SYRIZA stands clearly in opposition.

And not on the grounds of nationalism, as some other opposition parties claim. SYRIZA's rationale and discourse is based on an analysis that the crisis is not simply the result of the shortcomings of the Greek political economy, but rather a by-product of the global capitalist crisis.

SYRIZA also sees the political remedies proposed by the government coalition as an offensive of the dominant classes against working people and the traditional middle classes.

Its program involves restructuring the Greek development model, social control of the banks, and protection of the working-class, the unemployed and the poor. It is not only the popular anger that contributed to SYRIZA's electoral gains but a political (though not necessarily ideological) proximity of the population to its policies.

In fact, SYRIZA's commitment to these policies was joined with a commitment to contribute to the formation of a left-wing government in alliance with left political forces.

SYRIZA argues in favour of remaining in the Eurozone but rejects the bailout conditions. What do you think the prospects would be for a SYRIZA-led government renegotiating terms with the European authorities while remaining in the zone?

I would like to underline the fact that SYRIZA's proposal is not to renegotiate the so-called bailout agreement, but rather to completely reject it.

Its proposals are:

postpone payments to the country's creditors until the economy shows signs of growth (Greece has entered its fifth consecutive year of recession and holds the world record in GNP contraction at more than 20%). This is in fact similar to the plan followed by Germany in 1953;
socially control the banks and reorient their activity so they can provide credit for development that will restructure the real economy in the country;
abolish all anti-labour laws and the reestablish all necessary welfare policies that will ameliorate the social calamities caused by the Memorandum (eg 30% on or under the poverty line, 22% unemployment, 51% unemployment among the youth).

Could you outline the key aspects of SYRIZA's program? To what extent, and in what ways, might it take Greece down an anti-capitalist path?

In the Greek context, the most salient aspect of the SYRIZA's political program is its plan to undermine the governmental model, which for the longest time has functioned by ignoring popular, social and working-class concerns and demands.

It is a model that in the last two years has not just been indifferent to societal needs, but actively sees society as the “enemy”.

SYRIZA's program — and most importantly its political practice — is based on mobilising the society, realising a strategy: “empowering the powerless.”

In this context, SYRIZA's proposed reforms are radical. As well as having labour and social reforms at its heart, they realise a bottom-up strategy, which aims to establish a vision of a “society of needs”.

Why is the Greek Communist Party (KKE) being so intransigent in its refusal to work with SYRIZA?

The KKE is today a rare breed of Communist party. Its political coordinates are closer to the Portuguese Communist Party, although the latter is less dogmatic and with much less romantic sentiment toward the Soviet type of regimes.

In the past few years, its social presence has been organised through the formation of front organisations in various locals (labour, students, local and regional movements), which are exclusively controlled by the party.

Its rhetoric and overall activism is grounded on the analysis that the country's membership in the EU should be terminated and anyone who even critically supports EU membership is seen as pro-capitalist.

With this profile and strategy, the KKE has a selective presence in social struggles ― mainly in those that it is capable of controlling or even using to expand its recruitment.

This strategy seems to be transforming the party from a political organisation capable of influencing or capturing governmental power into a mere pressure group.

In the last local and regional elections (2010), the KKE essentially refused to assume any responsibility at that level, although on many occasions it had opportunity to assume governmental responsibilities in many cities.

Thus, the sectarianism shown before and after the May election is not a surprise. However, after the results of the last election and the significant advancement of SYRIZA (from 4.6% in 2009 to 16.8%), the party's rank and file has been challenging the leaders' strategy, especially its refusal to even consider taking part in a left wing coalition government.

In fact, the post-electoral opinion polls already predict a drop by more than 30% in electoral support for the KKE. At that point, at no great risk, one could predict serious developments within this party after the June election.

In the last election, there were significant gains for the neo-fascist party Golden Dawn. Could you tell us something about its historical roots and political program? How serious a threat do you think Golden Dawn is to Greek democracy?

The rise of Golden Dawn to electoral prominence is a very worrisome phenomenon, not just for Greece but for Europe.

This party is clearly a militaristic neo-Nazi political formation whose membership is mainly made up of a number of thugs, many of whom have been under judicial investigation for extreme criminal acts against immigrants and left-wing activists.

It is a party that has a relatively strong presence in high-schools, especially in working-class neighbourhoods as well as in neighbourhoods with a high level of criminality related to poverty and social exclusion. As well, as recent electoral studies indicate, and this is even more worrisome, members and supporters of this party have penetrated the middle and lower ranks of the police force.

Despite these facts, I believe the popularity of Golden Dawn in the last election does not indicate that there is a strong neo-Nazi current on the Greek political scene. Most of this vote, which reached almost 7%, is simply an apolitical and protest vote.

Many of its voters did not know the party shares ideas with the Nazism of the inter-war period. What strengthens this type of politics are the dire social consequences of the stability pact, the lack of any serious immigration policies, the de-democratisation of police due to the previous government's neo-authoritarianism and the failure of democratic and progressive citizens to co-ordinate an effective anti-fascist campaign.

In any event, this party is not going to disappear. However, its popular vote will definitely decrease in the next election.

You emphasise the importance of developing and strengthening Europe-wide networks of solidarity. Those reading this may be wondering how such solidarity can best be built. Do you have any advice?

As well as the obvious solidarity networks already in place (such as Party of the European Left and the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic 91������̳ in the European Parliament), SYRIZA is expected to gather support from all of those who rally against the austerity policies imposed by the Stability Pact.

As SYRIZA plans to renegotiate the whole arrangement and the fiscal prerequisites of the Eurozone, support can come even from mainstream political forces that see the impasse of the very foundation of the Euro and object to the bypass of the European institutions.