Just along from the Hungarian parliament building, visitors to Budapest can find Shoes on the Danube Bank. Consisting of 60 shoes facing the river looking westwards, it is a deeply poignant memorial to the Budapest Jews who were murdered by the fascist Arrow Cross government in 1944鈥1945. They were ordered to remove their shoes before being shot. Their bodies fell into the river.
Those killed in this way were only a fraction of Hungarian victims of the Holocaust. In 56 days during the summer of 1944 alone, Hungarian authorities worked with the Nazi regime to deport 437,402 Jews, primarily to the extermination camps at Auschwitz and Birkenau. Standing so close to the Hungarian parliament, the memorial is a reminder of the fragility of democracy and the terrible atrocities committed during the Second World War.
New and old forms
There is nothing specifically Hungarian about these experiences, of course. Europe has an intensely violent and racist history. No corner of the continent can claim innocence when it comes to the history and legacy of fascism.
The sheer horror of this past can also sometimes blind us to the emergence of nationalism and fascism in new forms. If there are no extermination camps, should we therefore be content that the contemporary far right has adapted to, and accepted, democracy and minority rights? Progressives and democrats in many European countries today face this question squarely. Germany, Italy, France, Britain, Austria, Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain, to name only some of the most prominent cases, are all countries that have either a growing or consolidated far-right presence in their national political scene.
Perhaps because of the history attached to the terminology of fascism, many observers are reluctant to describe these developments in such language, preferring instead to label it 鈥渇ar-right populism鈥. The danger of this linguistic shift is that it can aid the normalisation of these new far-right forces into an accepted part of the European political landscape. Twentieth-century fascism did not, after all, begin the journey to the extermination camps by acknowledging this as its goal.
Part of the mobilising power of the new far right in Europe lies in the 鈥渕emory politics鈥 of how 20th-century fascism is thought about today. The new far right rejects any notion of national responsibility for fascism. They claim they are not in continuity with these historical movements, while drawing on an idea of majority-white victimhood that resembles classical fascist discourses: that a liberal elite is systematically disadvantaging white-native populations to the benefit of ethnic and religious minorities.
Illiberal democracy
Today, Hungary stands at the centre of these developments. Since 2010, under Prime Minister Viktor Orb谩n and his Fidesz government, the country has pioneered what they call 鈥渋lliberal democracy鈥. For international observers the language Orb谩n and his party use is particularly striking for just how explicitly they reject liberal norms. They oppose the notion that civil society has rights and freedoms in relation to the state on the grounds that these are private associations, which have not been elected by the majority. They use similar 鈥渕ajoritarian鈥 sophistry to reject the idea that minority groups and ethnicities have human rights.
Whereas far-right parties are usually thought of as becoming more moderate as they move closer to power, Fidesz tells a different story. The party began life after the fall of communism as a young, liberal, even idealistic party, but over time has become deeply conservative. Zsuzsanna Szel茅nyi, a Hungarian oppositionist, left the party in 1994. She draws a parallel between Orb谩n鈥檚 autocratic takeover of the party from 1992 onwards with his rule in office.
鈥淰ery early on Viktor Orb谩n 鈥 pushed the party 鈥 with a strong hand 鈥 The whole decision making process, especially related to party finances, very quickly became un-transparent,鈥 she says. For Szel茅nyi, it was Orb谩n鈥檚 desire for power, rather than any deep ideological commitment to nationalist values, that has motivated him.
Concentration of power
Many Hungarian oppositionists share this perspective. They argue that the often-shocking pronouncements of the Fidesz government on migration and Islam are used cynically to win support and de-legitimise opponents.
D谩niel Bartha, the director of a Budapest-based think-tank, argues that the biggest concrete effect of the Orb谩n regime has been 鈥減ower concentration on a massive scale鈥. Fidesz has created a new loyal elite in business, public institutions, universities and the media, which is justified through the language of Hungarian nationalism and economic development.
One effect has been the abolition of a level playing field among parties competing in elections. Vast amounts of taxpayers鈥 money have been spent on government 鈥渋nformation campaigns鈥 that have targeted the likes of George Soros and [former] EU Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker as figures representing a pro-immigrant, anti-Christian conspiracy of global liberalism against Hungary.
Independent media has been aggressively marginalised as the government has lavished advertising revenue on supportive outlets, while boycotting critical ones. Its business supporters have then joined in, starving them of funds. Public sector broadcasters have also been turned into uncritical supporters of the government.
International appeal
Orb谩n鈥檚 rhetoric is without nuance and caveats. His speeches are all translated into English by the Hungarian government and published online, underlining his eagerness to promote these views globally. Conservative politicians have arguably assisted these efforts. Fidesz remains a member of the centre-right European People鈥檚 Party (EPP) grouping, albeit currently suspended pending an investigation.
Manfred Weber, the leader of the EPP, tweeted his congratulations to Orb谩n following his 2018 victory in the Hungarian elections, in spite of the fact that just a few days earlier Orb谩n had told Hungarian voters they faced a struggle to save their homeland from 鈥渢he alchemical workshop of George Soros鈥 and that 鈥渕igration is the rust that would slowly but surely consume our country鈥. The combination of antisemitism and Islamophobia, where Jews are attacked for giving support to Muslim immigration, is a key theme of the new far right.
Other centre-right politicians have also happily aligned with the Fidesz regime. In March, Orb谩n spoke at a conference in Budapest on migration alongside former French president Nicolas Sarkozy. Orb谩n used his speech to outline his version of the so鈥慶alled 鈥済reat replacement鈥 alt-right conspiracy theory, which says migration is part of a liberal elite plot.
In Britain, Orb谩n鈥檚 biggest supporter has been Nigel Farage. 鈥淭hank God, there is one European leader who is prepared to stand up for his principles, his nation, his culture, and his people,鈥 Farage said recently. The rise of Farage鈥檚 new Brexit Party has been a boost to the European far right.
EU institutions will be a critical theatre for the fight against the rise of fascism in the decade ahead. Whatever the final nature of Britain鈥檚 position in Europe, it is essential that we join the international resistance to the far-right advance and take our anti-fascist responsibilities seriously.
[Luke Cooper is a visiting fellow on the Europe鈥檚 Futures programme at the Institute of Human Sciences (Vienna). He is currently working on a book and podcast documentary series on the crisis of Europe. Reprinted from .]