Few areas of public expenditure are more costly and mindlessly wasteful than submarines. Australia鈥檚 effort is particularly impressive.
Pick a real winner by signing a contract for a yet-to-be-designed attack class submarine, supposedly 鈥渘ecessary鈥 in an 鈥渋ncreasingly dangerous鈥 region. Ensure the submarine design is based on a nuclear model, and charge at least twice as much for a less capable weapon. Make sure the order is for 12 of these yet-to-be-designed-and-built systems. And make sure that they are only ready sometime in the 2030s (by which time they ).
The dubious honour for this contract, initially costing $50 billion, went to the French submarine company DCNS (now called Naval Group), which nudged out German and Japanese contenders with pre-existing designs.
An Australian in April 2016 explained the decision was driven by DCNS鈥 鈥渟uperior sensor performance and stealth characteristics, as well as range and endurance similar to the Collins class submarine鈥. Other considerations were cost, schedule, program execution, through-life support and 鈥淎ustralian industry involvement鈥.
The French military establishment it as the 鈥渃ontract of the century鈥. Le Parisien鈥檚 editorial lauded the prospect of thousands of jobs. French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian a 鈥50-year marriage鈥 had begun.
The post-nuptials were not promising. Rear Admiral Greg Sammut in a Senate estimates hearing in 2018 that another $50 billion would be required to sustain the submarines for their operating life.
Tiffs and disagreements over distribution of labour and further costs started to bite. How much of the work would actually be undertaken by labour based in Australia? Would the French company be keeping the lion鈥檚 share?
Amid these problems, another idea started to gain momentum among defence chiefs: a competing, cheaper design, based on a rejigged version of Australia鈥檚 existing Collins Class submarine, might be a suitable alternative.
In the meantime, perhaps a German alternative might also figure, namely the Type 214 diesel electric submarine developed by Howaldtswerker-Deutsche Werft GmbH (HDW).
In May, Naval Group鈥檚 Transfer of Technology program manager Fabrice Leduc the submarine project had been subjected to a 鈥減olitical timeline鈥 following the change of defence minister. Peter Dutton was biding his time because 鈥渉e wanted to have some strong warranties from the industry and especially Naval Group in terms of cost and schedule鈥. The marriage had truly soured.
On September 15, the Canberra press gallery was awash with rumours that a divorce was being proposed.
The following day, Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced a security m茅nage 脿 trois with the United States and Britain, with Australia as the subordinate partner. The glue that will hold this union together is a common suspicion: China.
Replacing the Attack Class submarine will be a nuclear-powered alternative with Anglo-American blessing, on the US Virginia class or British Astute class.
The announcing the creation of AUKUS said the three countries were 鈥済uided鈥 by 鈥渆nduring ideals and shared commitment to the international rules-based order鈥. They resolved 鈥渢o deepen diplomatic, security, and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, including by working with partners, to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.鈥
AUKUS, they said, would be a new 鈥渆nhanced trilateral security partnership鈥 to further such goals.
The agreement is nothing less than an announcement to the region that the Anglophone bloc intends to police, oversee and, if necessary, punish.
The three countries will 鈥減romote deeper information and technology sharing鈥. Security, science relating to defence, technology, industrial bases and supply chains will be further integrated. Deeper cooperation would take place 鈥渙n a range of security and defence capabilities鈥.
The first initiative is a 鈥渟hared鈥 ambition 鈥渢o support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy鈥. US and British expertise will be drawn on to 鈥渂ring an Australian capability into service at the earliest achievable date鈥 from the submarine programs of both countries.
AUKUS unmistakably ties the countries into the same security orbit, meshing them to principles of 鈥渋nteroperability, commonality, and mutual benefit鈥.
Australia鈥檚 submarine policy has previously eschewed nuclear propulsion. Now, as a dowry for receiving such largesse, Canberra is offering up Australia as a confirmed US asset in policing the Indo-Pacific. US Navy commanders will be smacking their lips at in Australia as part of the arrangement.
Indo-Pacific neighbours will be troubled, despite AUKUS assurances that the vessels will only have a conventional weapons鈥 capability.
The dissolution of the union with Naval Group will also be costly, with the defence company bound to push for a generous compensation package: $400 million figure. To this can be added the $2 billion already spent.
As the divorce costs are sorted, Greens leader Adam Bandt is that the decision promises to 鈥減ut floating Chernobyls in the heart of Australia鈥檚 cities鈥. Protests from anti-nuclear activists and advocates are in the offing.
The enduring problem of Australia being able to build these submarines will have US lawmakers pushing for their construction on home soil, a situation that聽 could mirror the Naval Group contract headaches. Australia also able to build or maintain such vessels.
In helping create AUKUS, Canberra has exchanged one white elephant of the sea for another. It has also significantly increased the prospects for a potential nuclear conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. The warmongers will be ecstatic.
[Dr Binoy Kampmark lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email bkampmark@gmail.com.]