By Jim Green
A shipment of mixed plutonium/uranium oxide (MOX) nuclear reactor fuel from Europe to Japan poses dangerous weapons proliferation, environmental and public health risks.
There have been several shipments of high-level radioactive waste, and one shipment of plutonium, from Europe to Japan in the 1990s. However, the current shipment is the first transfer of MOX and it could be followed by as many as 80 MOX shipments over the next decade unless international opposition stops the trade.
An expanded MOX trade will spread weapons-useable plutonium more widely than ever before and raise tensions in the politically volatile north-east Asian region. The shipment currently travelling to Japan contains enough plutonium for about 60 nuclear weapons. Greenpeace predicts that as many as 40 tonnes of plutonium could be transferred to Japan over the next decade.
The safety of the shipment has been seriously jeopardised by cost-cutting and secrecy. Problems include inadequate design, testing and construction of the transport containers, insufficient emergency planning and inadequate liability coverage. The MOX will be used to fuel Japanese reactors which were not designed to handle this fuel, thus decreasing safety margins.
The MOX is being transported on two ships which left French and British ports between July 19-22. They are expected to arrive in Japan in mid-September. The ships will cross the Indian Ocean then pass through the Tasman Sea.
The route was announced by Japanese, French and British officials only after an international controversy. Specific details regarding the route have not been provided, nor is there a guarantee that the ships will not pass through waters under the jurisdiction of en-route nations.
The New Zealand and Irish governments have expressed formal opposition to the shipment because of safety and security concerns. Twenty-five countries in the Caribbean region protested against the MOX shipment, which may be the reason the current shipments are not passing through the Panama Canal. The South African government says that it does not want the ships passing through its territorial waters.
The growing controversy mirrors the experience of 1992, when more than 50 countries protested against a plutonium shipment from France to Japan.
Plutonium economy
Current efforts to expand the use of MOX represent the latest attempt by the nuclear industry to establish a civil plutonium economy.
Plutonium is virtually non-existent in nature but is produced in all nuclear reactors. Several countries operate reprocessing plants which separate plutonium, uranium and waste from spent reactor fuel. Historically, the main use for plutonium has been nuclear weapons construction, and the main purpose of reprocessing has been to separate plutonium for weapons.
Parallel plans were developed to use plutonium (and thus reprocessing plants) for nuclear power. There was great hope that "fast breeder" power reactors — which use plutonium as fuel and produce more plutonium than they consume — would become widespread. This would justify the expansion of the reprocessing industry, thus generating profits and also supplying plutonium for weapons if necessary.
Surplus plutonium produced in fast breeders could be mixed with uranium and used as MOX fuel, thus addressing another concern in the post-war decades: that uranium supplies could dry up. Thanks to the plutonium economy, nuclear power would be too cheap to meter and everyone would live happily ever after.
However, fast breeder programs have been cancelled, or are in grave danger, in every country in which they have been pursued, including Japan, the US, France, Germany, former Soviet states, the UK and France.
The collapse or near-collapse of fast breeder programs has posed particular problems for the nuclear industries in the UK and France. Reprocessing plants at Sellafield (Britain) and La Hague (France) are the biggest plutonium producers on the planet. Combined, they have more than 100 tonnes of plutonium in storage. Annually, billions of litres of radioactive waste are discharged from Sellafield, La Hague and the Dounreay reprocessing plant in Scotland into the Atlantic, Irish and North Seas.
With the failure of fast breeder programs, the rationale for reprocessing spent reactor fuel has become very dubious. It makes no sense to reprocess spent fuel simply to extract (unused) uranium because fresh uranium can be obtained more cheaply.
While there is still a pretense that fast breeder programs justify the ongoing separation of plutonium, this is becoming increasingly implausible. Some reprocessing plants may still be separating plutonium for weapons production, but not in large volumes, if at all. This rationale for reprocessing could be weakened still further if negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty are successful.
The failure of fast breeder programs should have signalled an end to the plutonium economy. But commercial, political and military interests have been established which depend on the survival and expansion of a plutonium fuel cycle.
Thus, the use of MOX in conventional power reactors was trumpeted. Consolidating a MOX fuel cycle will prop up the European reprocessing and MOX production industries. Large investments have been made in these industries in France, the UK and Belgium over the past decade.
MOX makes little economic sense. According to a report in the Economist magazine (June 1993), MOX would be more expensive than uranium fuel even if the plutonium was free. A 1998 report by the US-based Nuclear Control Institute says that uranium fuel is four to eight times cheaper than MOX.
However, there are some short-term interests driving the current expansion of MOX trade, as well as a strong ideological factor: keeping alive the fading dream of a plutonium economy.
Currently, only a very small percentage of nuclear power reactors around the world use MOX fuel, with most using low-enriched uranium fuel which cannot easily be transformed into a weapons-useable form. Countries using MOX for at least some of their reactors include Belgium, Germany and Switzerland.
The future demand for MOX in Germany and Switzerland is uncertain because of widespread opposition to reprocessing and nuclear power in general. Thus, the Japanese plutonium program takes on added significance.
Japan already has a stockpile of several tonnes of plutonium, (ostensibly) acquired for its now-stalled breeder program. While Japan has not built nuclear weapons, it has the expertise, the industrial and technical infrastructure, and the fissile material to do so within months or perhaps only weeks. Japan also has the technology to deliver nuclear weapons.
Some influential Japanese politicians, including former cabinet ministers, have publicly advocated nuclear weapons production in Japan in recent years. No doubt these politicians are interested in the military implications of MOX transfers.
The nuclear industry claims that extracting plutonium from MOX is technically complicated. However, the US Department of Energy said in 1997, "Fresh MOX fuel remains a material in the most sensitive category because plutonium suitable for use in weapons could be separated from it relatively easily". Similar statements have been made by the UK Environment Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
While Japan's bomb lobby wants plutonium for bombs, the logic of other MOX supporters in Japan is more difficult to fathom. The use of MOX, and the troubled breeder program, provide an excuse to send spent fuel overseas for reprocessing. Much of Japan's spent fuel is held at European reprocessing plants. Major reprocessing plants such as Sellafield have become de factor nuclear waste dumps.
Sending spent fuel overseas pacifies public opposition to Japan's nuclear power program and weakens opposition to plans to construct more reactors.
Regardless of the wishes of the Japanese nuclear industry, there is no certainty that its MOX program will go ahead due to serious technical problems and public opposition.
Australia's complicity.
Official reports show that thousands of tonnes of Australian natural uranium, enriched uranium, depleted uranium and plutonium are held by Japan (whether within Japan or in Europe). In the early 1980s, the Australian government signed agreements permitting the separation of Japanese plutonium produced using Australian uranium at British and French reprocessing plants. The Australian government also agreed to shipments of spent fuel, high-level waste and plutonium between Europe and Japan.
In 1992, the Labor government consented to a shipment of plutonium from France to Japan. The government claimed that Japan would only take receipt of enough separated plutonium for use in its planned fast breeder program.
Then foreign minister Gareth Evans said, "The government would not support the stockpiling of plutonium by Japan or any other non-nuclear weapon state". In fact, far more plutonium was sent to Japan than has been used in breeder reactors, and several tonnes are now stockpiled.
The agreement between Australia and Japan was renewed in May 1998, without any public or parliamentary discussion. Although the current shipment will not contain plutonium derived from Australian uranium, future shipments definitely will.
Allowing Japan to stockpile plutonium undermines claims that Australia is at the forefront of non-proliferation efforts. According to Greenpeace, "This (MOX) trade places a special burden on the South Pacific region which, thanks to Australia's pro-nuclear lobbying and secret dealings, will be viewed as the path of least resistance for most of the cargoes to travel through. The secretive nature of the Japanese plutonium trade — consented to in closed negotiations by Australian officials (as well as Canberra's complicity in keeping the route secret from the regional community) — exemplifies the undemocratic way in which the Australian government engages in nuclear matters."
The 1998 agreement could still be reviewed. The department of foreign affairs says that if there are significant changes in Japan's nuclear program, Australia could challenge the transfer of plutonium derived from Australian uranium. The risk of another country developing nuclear weapons is itself ample reason to veto the transfers.
Of course, challenging Japan's plutonium trade would jeopardise future uranium sales, (customer countries do not want strings attached), so Australian governments are unlikely to do so willingly.
Both Liberal and Labor governments have also been unwilling to challenge the passage of spent fuel, MOX, plutonium or high-level waste through the Tasman Sea and the South Pacific. They do not want to jeopardise the passage of US nuclear armed or powered warships through the region. Moreover, several shipments of nuclear waste from the Lucas Heights reactor in suburban Sydney have been sent overseas, and many more shipments are planned if a new reactor is built.