The plan had seemed so well organised.
Its first stage was executed on October 1 last year when the ruling elite of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) got the party鈥檚 Federal Political Committee (FPC) to force the resignation of general secretary Pedro Sanchez.
Sanchez鈥檚 crime had been his refusal, after the inconclusive June 26 Spanish general election, to agree to allow the formation of a minority government of the right-wing People鈥檚 Party (PP) through PSOE abstention. He also proposed to have this refusal put to members for endorsement, and to have a new primary for the position of general secretary.
However, the PSOE powers-that-be, led by Andalusian premier Susana Diaz and former prime minister Felipe Gonzalez, blocked this move. They used their majority on the FPC to force Sanchez, the first PSOE general secretary elected by members, to resign.
After also forcing Sanchez to surrender his parliamentary seat, one move remained: to have Diaz win the election for general secretary, announced for May 21.
But on that day, the schemes of all the PSOE grandees backing Diaz 鈥 including four former general secretaries, two previous Spanish prime ministers and all but one of seven regional premiers 鈥 went up in smoke.
Sanchez easily won the primary, by 50.3% to Diaz鈥檚 39.9%. Third candidate Patxi Lopez came last with 9.8%.
Anti-apparatus uprising
The former general secretary鈥檚 win was bigger than all predictions. He triumphed in 15 out of Spain鈥檚 17 autonomous communities (states) and 36 of its 50 provinces, with Diaz and Lopez only winning in their homelands.
In all six autonomous communities where PSOE premiers (鈥渂arons鈥) had backed Diaz, most of 鈥渢heir鈥 membership supported Sanchez. Asturian premier Javier Fernandez, the chair of the party鈥檚 interim management committee, had to wear a 53.4% to 39.6% win to Sanchez on his home turf.
Sanchez鈥檚 campaign amounted to an anti-apparatus uprising in which an amazing 79.8% of PSOE members took part. This was 12.8% more than in the 2014 primary that Sanchez 鈥 then the apparatus鈥檚 favourite 鈥 had won.
Sanchez鈥檚 resurrection and the humiliation of the PSOE establishment and its media backers (led by a rabid El Pais that described his win as 鈥渢he PSOE鈥檚 Brexit鈥) were fundamentally due to a very simple message: the PSOE belongs to its members and not the 鈥渘otables鈥 who pretend to rule in their name.
The intensity of the PSOE ranks鈥 shame, and rage at their leaders鈥 connivance in the return of the most corrupt party in Europe was clear from Sanchez鈥檚 first campaign meetings. These easily outnumbered those of Diaz and Lopez, at times overflowed the halls where he spoke and often boiled over with enthusiasm. They always ended with the singing of 鈥淭he Internationale鈥.
Bamboozled PSOE apparatchiks either tried to ignore this rising tide of revolt or claimed, in the word of one official, 鈥渋t is the usual crowd that goes from one place to the next鈥.
The barons, however, were in no doubt about the stakes. The March 19 El Espanol said one of the PSOE鈥檚 seven premiers spoke for all when he said that 鈥渋f this bloke wins, we鈥檙e gone鈥.
The barons鈥 fears were partly due to the thought of what the 鈥淪anchezistas鈥 in their territories might do to them at the regional congresses that follow the PSOE鈥檚 federal congress.
The counter-offensive of the PSOE machine came with the message 鈥渆ither Pedro or the PSOE鈥檚 hopes of winning government鈥 being broadcast through every regional organisation they controlled (14 of 19). Its aim was to collect every last endorsement for Diaz.
The PSOE statutes require aspirants to general secretary to provide endorsements from at least 5% of the membership (about 9500). The number achieved viewed both as an indicator of the likely final winner but also as an incentive for the undecided to 鈥済et with the strength鈥. The machine鈥檚 target was at least 20,000 more endorsements for Diaz than Sanchez.
Yet the result of the endorsement campaign confirmed just how much trouble Diaz was in. When her endorsements were verified they totalled a huge 60,231, a third of the PSOE membership and the result of a vast apparatus effort. Normally it would have delivered a knock-out psychological blow to any contender.
However, Sanchez鈥檚 campaign, run with barely any institutional support, still delivered 53,692 endorsements, with Lopez a distant third on 10,866. The 70% of PSOE members that signed an endorsement was more than had voted in 2014, confirming how polarised the fight had become.
Moreover, the endorsements were public whereas the actual vote would be secret. When it took place, Sanchez won 20,500 votes more than his endorsements, Lopez 3900 more and Diaz a shameful 1200 less. Even PSOE members who had felt compelled to endorse the Andalusian premier ended up supporting Sanchez in the privacy of the voting booth.
Sanchez鈥檚 campaign
Sanchez鈥檚 win dealt a numbing blow to the PSOE establishment, wresting all credibility from its tribe of 鈥渘otables鈥 who became political has-beens at a stroke.
Its fuel was membership fury at their leaders鈥 connivance in the return of the hyper-corrupt PP, but Sanchez鈥檚 win was about much more.
In a context where the PSOE has lost the support of five million voters since 2008, the youth vote is monopolised by anti-austerity party Podemos and its allies, and sister social-democratic parties in Greece, Holland and France have crashed to near-oblivion, the Sanchez campaign needed some credible vision of the way forward. Otherwise, it would lose the battle for left hegemony with the Podemos forces.
The alternative that most inspired Sanchez was Portugal, where Prime Minister Antonio Costa had organised a revolt against the Socialist Party old guard, then won national elections and governs with the support of the Left Bloc and the Portuguese Communist Party.
The Sanchez campaign started with a draft proposal called 鈥淲e Are Socialists 鈥 For a New Social Democracy鈥 鈥 targeting neoliberal capitalism and the PP as the principal enemies. It identified the main challenges for economic, social and environmental policy, outlined some proposals to meet them (like a guaranteed minimum income) and advocated a new, 鈥渂ottom-up鈥 model of PSOE.
The document said: 鈥淭he PSOE is living through a period of tension that at bottom derives from the crisis of the socialist project and its present lack of definition. There is only one way for the social democracy to overcome this moment of crisis 鈥 to revisit with clear ideas the definition of its project.鈥
At the heart of the proposal lay the intuition that there was the chance for a membership revolt to produce more than just a change of general secretary.
It could let the PSOE redefine its political space and language, change its method of functioning and break with its recent past, in particular the PSOE government in 2010 agreeing to the austerity dictates of the European Commission.
That would change the perception among the indignado generation that the PSOE and the PP are the same (the 鈥淧PSOE鈥) and boost its attractiveness vis-a-vis Podemos, which the PSOE calls 鈥渦nfit to govern鈥.
At the June 17-19 PSOE congress (slogan: 鈥淲e are the Left鈥), the new Sanchez majority will seek to acknowledge that allowing the PP to return was a mistake, criticise the Zapatero government鈥檚 handling of the crisis and characterise Spain as 鈥減lurinational鈥 in a concession to the national aspirations of various peoples within the Spanish state.
Left reactions
Commentary from the non-PSOE left has been wrestling with the contradiction between Sanchez as creature of the PSOE machine and Sanchez as leader of a democratic revolt 鈥 with something in common with Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn.
Sanchez is certainly no Corbyn. Josep Maria Antentas, sociology professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, said: 鈥淪anchez is at bottom an impostor who knew how to transform himself so as not to lose鈥.
What Sanchez is at any point in time is largely determined by the forces acting on him. On May 25, long-time left PSOE activist Enrique del Olmo told the web TV program En Clave Tuerka: 鈥淎 new Socialist Party is being born. There are many forces pushing in that direction and many forces fighting to make sure that doesn鈥檛 happen.鈥
How the PSOE now evolves will also be influenced by the approach of Unidos Podemos (Podemos plus the United Left). In a May 26 analysis of the Spanish political conjuncture, analysts for Podemos, which now faces a democratic revolt beyond its own immediate sphere of influence, wrote: 鈥淚f Sanchez abides by his new 鈥榥arrative鈥 and really tries to get closer to an alternative for change with Unidos Podemos, the media of the regime and his own internal opposition won鈥檛 stand for it.
鈥淚f he doesn鈥檛, we鈥檒l be the ones to punish him, along with his own rank and file and 鈥榬einspired鈥 voters who will feel betrayed.
鈥淭he PSOE, because of its central position, is not going to have a moment鈥檚 peace and will be in permanent tension between two different poles.鈥
That prediction is already coming true. Since Sanchez鈥檚 win, the 鈥渘ew鈥 PSOE has already supported PP Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy鈥檚 declaration of war on the pro-independence Catalan government鈥檚 unilateral referendum on independence. It has also decided to abstain on a Podemos censure motion against Rajoy.
If it continues much further along that path, the claim that 鈥淲e are the Left鈥 will look pretty hollow.
[Dick Nichols is 91自拍论坛 Weekly鈥檚 European correspondent, based in Barcelona. A longer version of this article can be read at .]
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