In the rush to heap scorn upon the Donald Trump administration, the president鈥檚 critics sometimes miss the forest for the trees. Such was the case in June when聽, a sixth branch of the US military.
Critics mocked the idea as 鈥溾, 鈥渟tupid鈥 and part of an 鈥溾.
鈥淭here鈥檚 no threat in space! Who are we fighting?鈥 asked聽.听 wondered if the Space Force would carry lightsabers.
It was easy to miss that the idea is not uniquely Trumpian鈥攁nd poses a real threat. For all intents and purposes, a space force already exists in the form of the聽聽(AFSPC), a 36,000-person division of the Air Force that鈥檚 been operating since 1982.
Where Trump鈥檚 proposal differs is that it forms an entirely new military branch devoted to space, something James Clay Moltz, associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and author of聽, says is 鈥渓argely unprecedented鈥.
According to聽, the Space Force would include a new centralised command structure for space operations that would take over satellite-based military tasks such as surveillance and navigation for ground troops, as well as monitoring and tracking missile launches. These tasks are all currently performed by the AFSPC.
It鈥檒l also take charge of any offensive capabilities developed for space, such as anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), introduce an 鈥溾 to support the rest of the armed forces, and oversee a new agency dedicated to developing 鈥渃utting-edge warfighting capabilities鈥 for space.
The proposal is viewed by the space savvy in the military as 鈥渆ither unwise, unnecessary or premature鈥, Moltz says 鈥 and almost certainly expensive. It鈥檚 on the basis of its potential wastefulness and redundancy that critics such as聽, ex-astronauts聽, Air Force secretary聽聽and other members of the military have assailed the idea.
But there鈥檚 a much bigger debate to be had. International conflict in space is no longer a plotline ripped from a sci-fi paperback. A space war is becoming more and more likely.听
Space geopolitics
US military dominance in space is really about maintaining military dominance on Earth. Space infrastructure, particularly satellites, is聽, servicing everything from navigation to weapons targeting to communications.
The global space arms race聽, when both the US and USSR began testing ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. During Ronald Reagan鈥檚 administration, the US Air Force became the first to test one on a spacecraft,聽.
The 1990 Gulf War 鈥 known now as the first 鈥溾 鈥 made US empire and satellites inseparable. With 24-hour satellite support, US forces could not only communicate across broad channels, but map out terrain, observe and predict enemy actions, and use new guided, 鈥渟mart鈥 weapons that were, in theory, less indiscriminate. Satellites make today鈥檚 drone warfare possible.
The US and Russia have adhered to what聽, senior scientist in the聽, calls an 鈥渦nofficial moratorium鈥 on stationing dedicated weapons in space (as opposed to ground-based systems that target spacecraft). However, the US 鈥 and, increasingly, its rivals 鈥 continue to invest in other forms of space militarisation.
The US leads the way in satellite capacity and space military technology, and has opposed past demilitarisation efforts. In 2006, the George W Bush administration blocked a United Nations resolution on arms control in space, issuing a聽聽that pledged to resist 鈥渘ew legal regimes or other restrictions,鈥 including arms control agreements, on US use of space.
In response to this and other steps, other countries have moved to shore up their own space capabilities.
China tested an ASAT in 2007. Both it and Russia have聽, such as ASAT technology and jamming GPS receivers. China and Russia鈥檚 advances left Washington spooked.
In 2014, the Pentagon invested an extra聽US聽in classified offensive space programs. In 2015, the 鈥渆merging threats鈥 of Russia and China were used to justify a聽 add-on for national聽security space capabilities, as officials openly talked about fighting a war in space.
But while in-orbit ASAT weapons exist, for the time being any space conflict would be fought from the Earth. For example, all three countries have capacity to disrupt enemy satellites by jamming them with their own, or to hack into a satellite鈥檚 ground operation.
But increased reliance on satellites for warfare 鈥 not to mention everyday life 鈥 opens up 鈥渁 critical vulnerability鈥, warns the Centre for Strategic International Studies (CSIS). Space infrastructure is fragile, vulnerable to hacking and able to be brought down by other spacecraft intentionally ramming into it, by ground-based ASAT missiles or even by loose pieces of debris.
Because space is unfamiliar terrain, nations don鈥檛 know how to interpret others鈥 behaviour. According to聽, an independent consultant on space security and former executive director of the聽, when the US and its allies run war games centred on space, they can quickly escalate to nuclear war.
鈥淚f one major power thinks the other is about to take out its satellites, it could take reciprocal action, or even launch a conventional or nuclear attack,鈥 says聽, director of the Arms and Security Project at the聽.
As space becomes increasingly cluttered with spacecraft, the chance of accidental calamity increases. Pentagon officials warn that聽. The US alone operates聽, nearly one in five of which is military.
For the first time,聽, producing a 鈥渄ebris cloud鈥 that added to the approximately聽聽currently in orbit, threatening to tear through spacecraft and add yet more debris. The destruction of spacecraft by ASAT tests, too, adds to the debris.
The more debris in orbit, the greater the threat to the non-military use of space that makes modern life possible. Traffic lights, banking systems, telephones, the internet, plane travel 鈥 .
Back to Earth
Given these dangers, many diplomats and activists are pushing to declare space a weapon-free global commons. But there鈥檚 been little movement on any legally binding agreement.
Although 鈥渨eapons of mass destruction鈥 have been banned in space since the聽, international regulation is sparse.
In 2008, Russia and China put forward a draft treaty on the聽(PPWT). 聽called the PPWT 鈥渦ndoubtedly the most substantive effort thus far鈥 to make weapon-free space a matter of international law. The US, however, said it couldn鈥檛 support such a 鈥渇undamentally flawed鈥 proposal.
Many analysts say a treaty is unlikely in the near future, and look to other avenues of demilitarisation.听
A more realistic solution, Steer says, is non-binding instruments like guidelines that regulate conduct in space, which can work due to political buy-in and reciprocity. These norms might include, for example, best practices on approaching another country鈥檚 spacecraft.
The US could be amenable to such agreements.听, commander of the US Strategic Command and a proponent of the Space Force, has urged the creation of 鈥溾.
Space profiteers
The deeply vested interests involved, which have the ear of US politicians, also make it difficult to roll back or halt the militarisation of space.
罢丑别听, a group of聽聽who shape US space policy, has a 鈥渦sers鈥 advisory group鈥 whose聽聽of Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman and other corporations.
The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA),聽a trade group that counts these and other companies as members,聽funded the聽聽calling for government investment in national security space assets. It has called for greater national security investment in space at the聽.
The Symposium, now in its 34th year, embodies the close ties between industry and government on space policy.听聽by the AIA and its defense contractor members, the Symposium offers a chance for industry to network with representatives of think tanks and educational institutions, foreign leaders, and military, national security and other government officials.
This year鈥檚 event in April featured speeches from , Commerce Secretary聽, US聽听补苍诲听.
Industry influence extends to the politicians who advocate further space militarisation. Republican Representative Mike Rogers, reportedly instrumental in selling Trump on the Space Force, has received聽.听Republican Representative Doug Lamborn and Democratic Representative Adam Schiff, both big boosters of a聽, represent districts populated by the defense industry and have raked in similarly large donations.
The Space Force contributes to this build-up, further entrenching militarisation and feeding money to defense contractors.
鈥淧resident Trump鈥檚 enthusiasm for the Space Force,鈥 Hartung says, 鈥渃reates a danger that existing norms, like keeping weapons out of space, are more likely to be set aside.鈥 He says the resulting space arms race 鈥渃ould spark a general war鈥.听
Yet before efforts to rein in weaponisation can gain momentum, public awareness must be raised. This task is made harder by widespread media derision of Trump鈥檚 Space Force proposal.
Conflict in space is a clear and present danger. We need to take it seriously.
[Abridged from .]