By Norm Dixon
"It is one of the ironies of the history of our country that a referendum to test support for the democratisation process should itself have been conducted in such an undemocratic manner. The only South Africans who had a voice in the matter at no point ... ever exceeded 17% of the total population. This unilateral action of the de Klerk government casts serious doubt on their commitment to democratic values. The future of our country is not a matter of 'for whites only'. It is the concern of all South Africans ... The ANC welcomes the decisive endorsement of the negotiation process by the majority of our white compatriots."
The restrained tone of the African National Congress statement welcoming the 70% majority for the "yes" vote in the March 17 whites-only referendum contrasted with the enthusiastic claims being made by the big business press: "Whites vote to bury apartheid" declared the Sydney Morning Herald; "Win For Black Rule" screamed the Australian's banner headline.
The ANC statement pointed out that the vote "was not an endorsement of the National Party and its policies. It was a 'yes' vote for democracy! This is a position in accord with that of the majority of Black South Africans whose voice could not be heard in [the] referendum ... [The] result was a mandate not only to President de Klerk, but to all the parties that are involved in CODESA to act with all deliberate speed in the negotiation process in order to realise an interim government that will prepare and supervise truly democratic elections for a constituent assembly."
The ANC's more sober assessment is informed by its experience of the nature of the minority regime that de Klerk heads. De Klerk began his career as an unabashed racist in the P.W. Botha mould. After the mass democratic movement, and the imposition of trade sanctions, forced his regime to release Nelson Mandela and unban the liberation movements, he launched a secret war on ANC supporters using Inkatha killers, in many cases openly supported by members of the South African Defence Force.
That the regime is motivated by pure pragmatism was underlined by events surrounding the calling of the referendum, the way the campaign was conducted and de Klerk's constant reassurance to the white electorate that he would not compromise his "bottom line" in the pending negotiations on a constitution: a white veto over decisions made by the representatives of the black majority.
The consensus within the democratic movement is that de Klerk cynically engineered the National Party's own defeat at the hands of the Conservative Party in the February 19 Potchefstroom by-election, the event the president used as justification for calling the referendum.
Just two days before the by-election, education minister Piet Marais announced the retrenchment of 4000 white teachers and the doubling of school fees for most white students. More than a quarter of Potchefstroom's voters were students at a university and a teachers
The National Party had been steadily losing white support to the pro-apartheid, anti-negotiations Conservative Party of Andries Treurnicht, whose support amongst whites had risen from 32% in 1989 to over 40%. The NP had recently lost a string of by-elections to the CP. Unless de Klerk could pull a rabbit out the hat, he faced possible defeat in any future whites-only general election because of the gerrymander that favours the CP's rural constituencies. Of course, it is doubtful that the black majority would allow such an election ever to take place again.
Nor could de Klerk possibly hope to realise his goal of an alliance with apartheid collaborators in the black population to govern "post-apartheid" South Africa if he could not prove he was in command of the powerful white state apparatus. It was now or never if his plans were to stay on course.
The main goal of the referendum was to neutralise the far right. It forced the white population to focus on the consequences of a reversion to traditional apartheid policies and to ask who would have a better chance at protecting white privileges at the negotiating table: de Klerk or Treurnicht and his goose-stepping neo-Nazi allies, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbewiging (AWB — Afrikaner Resistance Movement). The referendum had the immediate effect of causing serious schisms just beneath the surface of the CP; one faction, possibly a majority of its parliamentary caucus, favours participation in CODESA and is likely to split from the CP in the near future.
The referendum also allowed de Klerk to sidestep his promise to hold a referendum or general election after a final constitution has been negotiated. He has done this by defining a "yes" vote now as approval for the final product of negotiations.
De Klerk thought nothing of matching the far-right's racist arguments for a "no" vote with equally racist, bloodcurdling warnings of a bloody black uprising. De Klerk embarked on a whistle-stop tour of the country to assure white voters that the NP remained committed to the constitutional blueprint it unveiled in September. This would entrench a white minority veto over a future government's decisions (see accompanying article).
The campaign also highlighted how effective economic sanctions were in fighting apartheid, despite years of vehement denial by South African government officials and its apologists. NP politicians and advertisements funded by South Africa's biggest corporations pleaded that unless a landslide "yes" was returned, the country's emergence from isolation — symbolised by its cricket team being accepted back into international competition — would be stalled. Loud warnings were issued about a new round of trade, sport and economic sanctions which would "cripple" South Africa "once and for all".
The democratic movement sharply criticised the racially exclusive nature of the referendum. The Tripartite Alliance — the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the Party — condemned de Klerk for "taking this gamble with the future of our country". De Klerk's referral of a decision on the future of negotiations to a potential veto by the white minority also signalled that the NP would not hesitate to unilaterally alter the course of CODESA.
But the movement also recognised that a victory for the far right would be a disaster. A poll boycott or demonstrations aimed at disrupting the referendum could only play into the far right's hands. A "yes" vote would benefit the transition to democracy and speed up the negotiations. At the same time as de Klerk was dealing a blow to the right wing, he was losing a major weapon in his armoury.
Over the years, he has used the far right as an important component of his strategy to slow down the process of change on the excuse that it was important to take the supporters of the white conservatives with him. The massive victory of the "yes" vote has deprived de Klerk and the NP of that delaying tactic.
The leading black progressive weekly New Nation warned that "there are no guarantees that the yes vote would make [de Klerk] more amenable to the demands of the liberation movement ... he will be able to claim to be representing all whites ...
"Once he has secured the yes vote, nothing stops him from taking an intransigent, even rightwing position, on any number of issues at CODESA. It was de Klerk and the Nationalists alone who decided that they would call a referendum, it was they alone who decided what the referendum question would be, but it must not be they alone who decide the future."
It is this understanding of the dangers ahead that has led the ANC and the democratic movement to begin a mass campaign for CODESA to rapidly move to the formation of an interim government and the election of a constituent assembly.