Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords
By Ahmed Rashid
Pan Books 2001
250 pages $20
REVIEWED BY CHRIS SLEE
Re-published with a new foreword after September 11, Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords by Far Eastern Economic Review journalist Ahmed Rashid, provides a concise history of the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan and a comprehensive description of the nature of the regime.
The Taliban emerged in 1994. Afghanistan had been devastated, first by the 1978-89 war between the US-backed right-wing counter-revolutionaries (known as the mujaheddin) and the left-wing Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government, supported by Soviet troops, and then, after the 1992 fall of the PDPA government, by fighting between the mujaheddin groups.
In Rashid's words, "The country was divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords had fought, switched sides and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed".
"Taliban" literally refers to the students at Islamic schools (madrassas). In 1994, some members of the Islamic clergy organised madrassa students into a fighting force with the supposed aim of restoring peace by defeating the warlords. In some areas they did bring relative peace for a time. But they never succeeded in controlling the whole of Afghanistan. They became merely the strongest participant in the battles amongst the warlords.
The Taliban captured Kabul in 1996. It was able to quickly seize control of most of the country because it was heavily supported by the Pakistan and Saudi Arabian governments, which supplied weapons, transport and fuel. Pakistani military advisers played a key role in the Taliban army.
During the war against the PDPA, Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence agency (ISI) had been the main channel for US support to the mujaheddin. The ISI had particularly favoured the extremely reactionary mujaheddin group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. After the fall of the PDPA, Pakistan backed Hekmatyar in the intra-mujaheddin wars before switching support to the Taliban.
Pakistan hoped that the Taliban could gain control of the whole territory of Afghanistan, providing a secure environment for building oil and gas pipelines between Central Asia and Pakistan. This never happened, largely because rival warlords were backed by other countries, including Russia, Iran, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
The proposed pipelines were not the only motive for Pakistani support of the Taliban. Sections of the Pakistani ruling class were heavily involved in the smuggling of drugs and other goods between Afghanistan and Pakistan. They preferred to deal with the Taliban rather than a multitude of competing warlords, each demanding a share of the profits.
The Pakistani army also used Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan for training Kashmiri Islamist groups to fight against India.
The oppressive character of Taliban rule is well known. Women were denied any opportunity for education (this was supposed to change once peace was restored and an "Islamic" curriculum developed, but this never happened). Women were not allowed to work, except in the health area. They were forced to wear the burqa outside the home.
But despite its strict enforcement of religious rules, the Taliban allowed opium production to flourish in the areas it controlled. All the competing armed groups relied on revenue from opium sales to finance their war effort, and the Taliban was no exception.
Rashid points out that during the 1980s, "An immense narcotics trade had developed under the legitimising umbrella of the CIA-ISI covert supply line to the Afghan mujaheddin". This trade continued into the 1990s, funding all the competing factions. The Taliban imposed a 20% tax on each truckload of opium produced in the areas it controlled.
One Taliban official told Rashid that: "Opium is permissible because it is consumed by Kafirs [unbelievers] in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans". In reality, much of the opium was consumed in predominantly Muslim countries. Pakistan had an estimated five million addicts in 1999.
The US initially welcomed the rise of the Taliban. It was seen as an ally against Iran. The proposed oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia to Pakistan were also a potential means of increasing US influence in the Central Asian region at the expense of Russia. Unocal, a US oil company, held negotiations with the Taliban.
But by late 1997, the US had turned against the Taliban. Rashid attributes this largely to a campaign by US feminists against the Taliban's anti-women policies. But he adds that the US was also concerned that the Taliban regime was allowing Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network to operate from its territory.
The US was largely responsible for the creation of this network in the first place. The CIA and the US army, in collusion with Pakistan's ISI and Saudi intelligence, recruited, armed and trained tens of thousands of reactionary Muslims from many countries to fight against the PDPA. Bin Laden became the leader of this network.
But the tactic of arming and training Islamic reactionaries proved to be a two-edged sword for the US. Once the PDPA fell, bin Laden's followers lost their usefulness and became a nuisance to the US. They were hostile to US policy towards Saudi Arabia, Palestine and Iraq, and began attacking US targets.
The US demanded that the Taliban crack down on bin Laden. However, the Taliban needed bin Laden's money and troops for their fight against the rival warlords, who had come together in the Northern Alliance.
The conflict between the US and the Taliban came to a head after September 11. The US invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban regime, but whether it is able to establish a stable pro-imperialist regime remains to be seen.
Rashid blames the "long years of US and Western neglect" following the departure of Soviet troops for allowing the Taliban to turn Afghanistan into a "sanctuary for extremist groups".
But the devastation of Afghanistan is not just a result of "neglect". It is a logical outcome of the US-backed counter-revolutionary war against the PDPA government. As Rashid's book makes clear, bin Laden's movement is a byproduct of that war.
Former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski downplayed the significance of the reactionary Islamic forces who have turned from allies into enemies of the US with his now notorious statement: "What was more important in the world view of history? The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?"
It is unlikely that Brzezinski would repeat this statement after September 11. But it expresses the real attitude of the US ruling class. The defeat of the 1978 Afghan revolution and the restoration of capitalism in the former Soviet Union are more important to US imperialism than the rights of Afghan women or the victims of al Qaeda terrorism.
From 91×ÔÅÄÂÛ̳ Weekly, May 22, 2002.
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