ALEXANDER BUZGALIN is a professor of economics at Moscow State University and one of the leaders of the Party of Labour. BORIS SLAVIN is a political commentator for the newspaper Pravda and a member of the Russian Party of Communists. VADIM DAMIER, a historian and co-founder of the Green Party, is now a member of the anarcho-communist group IREAN. This round table discussion was led by POUL LARSEN.
How do you view the developments on the political scene? Why has the socialist left been marginalised?
Alexander Buzgalin: Traditionally, democratic socialist forces have been quite weak in this country. The left democratic forces are dispersed, and the sharpening of national contradictions has strengthened the tendency toward polarisation.
Perestroika was a bureaucratic struggle against bureaucratism, in which victory was gained not by the people but by a new elite. Perestroika gave rise to powerful national conflicts.
"Patriotic" ideas have become hegemonic. The part of the Communist movement represented by so-called "national Communists" now finds itself on the same side of the barricades as forces which are right-wing in a European sense against the classic right-wing liberal Yeltsin government and its supporters.
Boris Slavin: I agree, but I would like to emphasise more strongly that the left here was always identified with the Communist movement, and that this movement basically had a totalitarian, Stalinist character.
However, I would warn against judging Russian reality in terms such as "left" or "right", "communist" or "non-communist". The left, just like the right, is composed almost totally of Communists or former Communists. Today there are Communists among the liberals, in the right-wing parties and on the left. Even in Pamyat there are Communists.
The leaders first went from orthodox Stalinist positions toward Social Democratic and then liberal democratic positions. Both Yeltsin and Gorbachev went through this evolution. But this was only a short period, and then liberal bourgeois tendencies, neo-conservative ones, won out.
Alexander Buzgalin: They were, from the very start, bureaucrats isolated from the people, pursuing their own interests. They would take any position which could secure the privileged status of the bureaucracy. If this was Stalinism, then they were Stalinists; if it was Brezhnevism, they were Brezhnevites. When the possibility emerged of becoming Social Democrats, they had to become Social Democrats, and after that they could become anything expedient, including right-wing liberals or even monarchists.
Boris Slavin: I wouldn't say that the left plays no role at all on today's political scene. Already three parties have been officially registered: the Russian Communist Workers Party, the Russian Party of Communists and the Socialist Party of Workers.
Now the Party of Labour is preparing for registration — this could be a party with a broad influence.
These are still small parties, but they're gaining strength. So I don't think one should be too pessimistic. We're seeing the first signs that unity of all left forces will emerge; if this unity comes to pass, the left will constitute a genuine force, with its own press and so on.
Vadim Damier: In my view, there is no left movement in this country today. There are only some rudiments of a left wing, which could be transformed into a real left movement if the situation develops favourably.
It is necessary to distinguish between the radical left, the "soft left" and those left forces that are collaborating with the most extreme right-wing, pro-fascist forces. "Leftists" of this type don't fit the concept of a left wing.
The "soft left" make concessions to the liberal spirit of the time. They basically support the concept of a market economy. Maybe they want the most socially just model, but nevertheless they've endorsed the principle.
Secondly, the "soft left" has a definite fear of mass actions on the streets. Last autumn the "soft left" initiated quite large actions — in Moscow, for example, there were demonstrations by the trade unions against price rises and the economic policies of the government. But from mid-December the "soft left" abandoned this course, and the majority of people who are now taking to the streets are under the strong influence of the national-patriotic forces.
The radical left is quite small, and consists first and foremost of the left of the anarchist movement. There are also various Trotskyist organisations — in Moscow there are two of them — and a number of independent Trotskyists. Despite our numerical weakness, we're quite active.
It seems that a number of militant workers groups which earlier pursued a relatively independent line, notably the Independent Union of Miners, have been coopted by the Yeltsinites and are now confining themselves to "loyalist" positions.
Alexander Buzgalin: A large section of the workers movement orients toward contemporary trade unionist conceptions, and therefore sees itself as supporting the present right-liberal government while fighting for certain concessions and changes in government policy. This applies to the Independent Union of Miners, which was formed on the basis of the strike movement.
A contrary potential also exists, basing itself on the elements of socialism which existed. This potential never really came into play — it didn't link up with the political movement, and practically suffocated when nomenklatura capitalism took the offensive. I'm referring here to the potential for self-regulation which appeared during the strikes of 1989, but which we didn't manage to organise. We're suffering from this mistake today, but that's how things developed.
In the Kuzbass, for instance, the former strike committees are
now the main opponents of the struggles of other 91×ÔÅÄÂÛ̳ of the working class. This fragmentation was one of the main features of the old regime, and this still lives on.
I'm afraid that the deterioration of the economic situation will lead to spontaneous explosions, which are likely to develop in the direction of the national-communist and chauvinist movements, since they provide an easy outlet for discontent.
Boris Slavin: The official line is the pitting of one part of the working class against another. A sign of this is the 10-
fold increase in the salary of the miners, who now earn 13-15,000 roubles a month, at a time when a doctor or teacher receives 1000-1500.
The difference in income creates tensions between various parts of the workers movement, and there is no trade union force which can unite all these branches. That's the key weakness of the union movement, and from this flows the task of the new left forces — to unite the workers. However, if the left is to unite the workers movement, to unite the trade unions, it has to unite itself. If by that time the left wing can unite itself, and manages to unite the progressive trade union movement, then there is reason to be optimistic.
Vadim Damier: It resembles the situation in Poland in the first period after Jaruzelski was ousted. The official and the new trade unions in a sense change places, as the forces supported by the new trade unions come to power.
However, there's also an opposition in some of the more radical places — apparently this is the case with the miners' unions in Karaganda and the Donbass. There are still elements of an opposition supporting self-management, not as an alternative form of social organisation for the whole of society, but as a transformation of enterprises into the collective property of the labour collectives.
Usually the official trade union in an enterprise was never really a trade union in the proper sense of the word. It was an organisation dealing with social insurance and the distribution of vacation entitlements — that is, a mechanism of interchange between management and the labour collective.
The second weakness of the official trade unions is the level of bureaucratisation. In this respect, however, they're no different from the new independent trade unions, which have been bureaucratised extremely rapidly.
Inside the official unions there are two lines. One is the more conciliatory, pro-government line pursued by the leaders of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia. The second, in part more radical, tendency is located mainly in the big cities — Moscow, Leningrad and a few others.
There's another important and sad feature of the workers movement — the total lack of solidarity. Every section of the working class, every enterprise, every region is trying to grab something for itself, without considering the consequences for others.
How can the left wing, with its modest forces, intervene in the labour movement in the current conjuncture? What
role can the slogan of self-management play?
Boris Slavin: I think the idea of self-management can play a role at a time when the country's leaders are trying to ensure that the bulk of the shares will be in the hands of capitalists, and not of the labour collectives. The idea of self-management can represent the interests of the collective and can unite many collectives that want to maintain their control over the means of production. But I have to disagree with the position that this idea should be put up as the main slogan, as the basis on which a new society should be built. I don't envisage generalised self-management in the near future, or the possibility of conquering power on the basis of this. Self-management is an idea for the future.
Vadim Damier: On the left there are different understandings of self-management. The first is the concept of self-management as a model for the whole of society. This is our position. The second is that the labour collectives should run the enterprises and appropriate the profits to themselves, but that they should not be given the enterprises as their property. The third concept, supported by most of the "soft left" and by the more radical elements in the trade unions, is the idea of self-management as one of the forms of privatisation.
In my view, self-management organised as a structure from above won't work — it won't be able to solve the country's problems. Only the self-organisation of working people from below can do the job.
There is one possibility, though I can't say how realistic it is. In the near future we're likely to see a continuation of the current economic policy, and therefore we can expect large-scale closures of industrial enterprises. In that situation the labour collectives will get the sack. The unemployment benefit is miserable, so what needs to be done? The only thing we can advise the labour collectives to do — and here the left can play a certain role — is to prepare sit-down strikes and factory occupations.
Alexander Buzgalin: The idea of self-management can be useful in various contexts. First of all, in the struggle for alternative models of debureaucratisation. The first step is that the collective should become the manager.
Secondly, we have to fight for basic democracy — that is, for self-management in the social and political sphere.
The third aspect is the idea of people's power in the economy, in politics and in the social sphere, in the struggle with the existing regime. Finally, we have to support functional self-management, that is, support the various moves to include social organisations in the management of economic and social processes on a macro level.