By Renfrey Clarke
MOSCOW - In the last week of December, one of the leading figures in the newly elected Russian parliament was expelled from Bulgaria after urging the replacement of Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev, whom he described as "scum". The Romanian authorities lodged an official protest after he described their country as "artificial" and populated by "Italian Gypsies". Germany, where he had recently met with leaders of an extreme right-wing party, refused him a visa on December 29; following the refusal, he threatened to "completely destroy" Germany through the launching of "World War Three". A ban by the French government followed soon after.
Since the Russian elections on December 12, Vladimir Zhirinovsky has rarely been out of the news. Journalists have been faced with a dilemma. The 47-year-old lawyer, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), is a skilled media performer with a rich fund of outrageous utterances that make eye-catching headlines. In themselves, Zhirinovsky's statements do not deserve to be publicised. Vulgar bombast, often offensively racist, they are no different from the views of countless small-time demagogues sounding off in the queues of Russia.
The elections, however, transformed Zhirinovsky and his party from a sinister political sideshow into one of the most important forces in Russian politics. The party list results gave the LDP 22.8% of the vote, well ahead of the pro-government Russia's Choice bloc, which ran second with 15.4%.
After counting finished in the territorial electorates, which account for half the seats in the lower house, the LDP was still the second-largest bloc, with potential for gathering a majority of deputies behind its banner on important issues.
The attitude of foreign governments toward Russia quickly took on a totally new cast. The assumption that a capitalist Russia would necessarily be a benign ally of the West was revealed as untenable.
The illusion that most Russians supported President Boris Yeltsin and his model of pro-capitalist "reform" was blown apart. The price of sweeping attacks on popular living standards, and of the presidential lawlessness that overthrew the former constitution and bombarded the old parliament into submission, was shown to include the debasing of Russian political culture to the point where broad 91×ÔÅÄÂÛ̳ of the population could vote for a party widely described as "fascist".
The alarm increased when the results of exit polling of military voters indicated that the armed forces had voted heavily for Zhirinovsky. Citizens of other former republics of the USSR - and also of Poland and Finland - reflected in horror on the numerous statements in which Zhirinovsky had declared his intention of restoring the boundaries of the tsarist empire. Western hopes of general reductions in military spending plummeted.
Within Russia, liberal "reformers" met the election results with incomprehension and disbelief. Konstantin Borovoi, head of the Economic Freedom Party, argued on television that the LDP had used the skills of one of its candidates, a well-known hypnotist, to mesmerise large numbers of voters. Television journalists and programmers were accused of falling for Zhirinovsky's gift of self-advertisement, providing him with large amounts of free publicity. Surveys showed, however, that the LDP and its candidates had received substantially less media exposure than the vanquished Russia's Choice.
Yeltsin himself responded with a nine-day silence. Then in a series of statements he admitted that the government had received a strong rebuke from a people whose patience had "been exhausted".
The large vote for the LDP, in Yeltsin's view, represented a straightforward protest against the fall in mass living standards. "Don't forget the poor", he cautioned on December 21. "They are the ones who voted for the Liberal Democratic Party. They were not voting for a leader, for a program, but as a protest against poverty."
Trying to salvage what he could from the debacle, the Russian president argued that "whoever the voters cast their ballots for, they were unanimous that Russia needed strong authority, that Russia needed order".
Yeltsin did not mention the embarrassing fact that his new ultra-presidential constitution had "passed" (with the support of fewer than a third of eligible voters) only because Zhirinovsky had called vigorously on his supporters to vote for it. The LDP leader has made no secret of his desire to succeed Yeltsin as president, and was clearly delighted by the thought of taking over the extravagant rights Yeltsin had demanded for the executive branch.
Russian liberals and their Western supporters, who had apologised for every new authoritarian initiative of the Russian president, were left to ask themselves whether, in seeking virtually unlimited powers for the "democrat" Yeltsin, they had created the mechanisms for dictatorial rule by the bellicose ultra-nationalist Zhirinovsky.
For leftists and repentant liberals, making a thorough study of Zhirinovsky's movement is now an important priority. What is the LDP, and does it merit the label "fascist"? Why did it poll so heavily, and how can its progress be blocked?
Zhirinovsky has now sued and won damages from at least one journal that described him as fascist. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny the affinities between his political views and practices and those of leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini.
Like the classical fascists, Zhirinovsky is contemptuous of truthfulness, logic and consistency in his arguments. Abandoning the effort to influence civilised opinion, he is free to make an unrestricted play for the savage and primitive in Russian popular consciousness. Like the German fascists of the 1920s, he dwells heavily on the sense of national humiliation of a people whose country is in chaos; like them, he promises a return to collective greatness through subjugating neighbour states.
Again like the German and Italian fascists, Zhirinovsky promises a population traumatised by social and economic crisis that he will restore a secure and predictable life through the ruthless imposition of order. At campaign rallies, he won ovations with a call for dealing with crime by setting up courts martial and shooting "ringleaders of bandit groups" after summary trials. In language which at times has recalled that of Yeltsin, he has argued that full democracy in Russia is possible only after "five or six years" of tough, centralised authoritarian rule.
During the election campaign, the content of the LDP's economic program varied widely according to the speaker and the audience. But like prominent fascist leaders, Zhirinovsky has consistently combined vehement anticommunism and defence of private property with pledges to aid petty entrepreneurs suffering from capitalism's crisis. In an interview reported in the English-language Moscow Times on December 23, the LDP leader said he was for "a complete switch from a state to a private economy".
Yeltsin's big mistake, Zhirinovsky said, was to leave ex-Communist bureaucrats in positions where they could sabotage economic change. The result, the LDP leader reportedly argued, was that Russia's entrepreneurs and private farmers were stifled before having a chance to succeed.
If Zhirinovsky's ideas coincide on many points with those of classical fascism, the resemblance between his movement and those of Hitler and Mussolini is much less close. The LDP lacks the tight organisation and paramilitary trappings of Hitler's brown shirts, and, so far, has not made physical attacks on leftists.
The social composition of LDP supporters also differs from that of most avowedly fascist movements. For the most part, the people who attended Zhirinovsky's rallies and voted for his party were neither ruined petty entrepreneurs, nor the chronically unemployed, semi-criminal "lumpenproletariat". Though expanding, these layers are still small in Russia.
Survey results published in Izvestiya on December 30 showed that the LDP's core supporters were male industrial workers aged between 25 and 40, employed in state-owned enterprises in small cities and towns. As the party's support increased during the election campaign, it came to reflect the overall make-up of the population more closely. A significant difference between LDP voters and other Russians was that the LDP voters were much more likely to describe the situation in their cities and in the country as a whole as "very bad".
As the economic catastrophe in Russia continues, the weight of unemployed workers and "de-classed" elements among the LDP's supporters will undoubtedly grow. But for the present, few supporters of the LDP come from the social layers that in the West tend to furnish recruits to fascist groups. Paradoxically, Zhirinovsky's main backing in the elections came from layers that in Western society would be regarded as the natural constituency of the political left.
The mainstream media in Russia have yet to come up with a coherent set of explanations for the LDP's strong performance. Some of the first "reasons" advanced by media commentators involved a refusal to accept that the Russian masses had in fact turned against the government and its neo-liberal strategies. Zhirinovsky was said to have profited because Yeltsin held aloof from the election campaigning, refusing to stake his authority on Russia's Choice. The failure of pro-"reform" forces to unite in a single electoral bloc was said to have confused voters.
The large vote for the LDP was also attributed to Zhirinovsky's media skills. Commentators stressed the contrast between the stolid television presentations of most election candidates and Zhirinovsky's often shocking, always memorable performances.
It was only after Yeltsin had admitted that a strong element of protest had manifested itself in the vote that the popular repudiation of the government came to be generally acknowledged. But like Yeltsin, most commentators still interpreted the mass turning away from the government as a reaction to the "pain of reform", rather than as an indication that the government's strategies were fundamentally flawed.
Yeltsin on December 21 argued that Russians who voted for the LDP were not expressing support for the party's ideas. This position is hard to sustain. The LDP's ideas, however reprehensible, were virtually impossible to mistake. If Russians simply wished to protest against the government's policies, they had the option of staying at home on voting day, and overall turnout was in fact far below that in the presidential elections of June 1991.
Large numbers of those who voted for the LDP made their decision only in the final days of campaigning. But this does not show that their decision was made from emotional impulse. Rather, it suggests the reverse: television viewers by this time had spent several weeks assimilating diverse political appeals.
The signs indicate that most of those who voted for Zhirinovsky did so because they had listened to his arguments and decided that they agreed. Contrary to Yeltsin's suggestion, most of these people were not poor in Russian terms. More than two thirds were in employment, and only about 10% were pensioners.
To say that the vote for Zhirinovsky was in most cases conscious and deliberate is not, of course, to explain why it was so large. The key reason for the LDP's successes was the patent failure of the government's economic strategies, which caused voters not simply to protest, but to look for an alternative.
Their search for this alternative was conditioned by two important phenomena: a broad, long-standing "lumpenisation" of Russian workers, cut off by the disaster of Stalinism from their progressive historical traditions; and the failure of Russia's left parties to seize the political space that had opened up as Yeltsin and his followers became discredited.
The "lumpenisation" of many millions of Russian workers is a sad but undeniable fact that arises directly out of their experience during the Soviet period. With little direct knowledge of how the capitalist system functions - and disbelieving the Soviet-era denunciations of capitalism - these workers have little understanding of their distinct interests as paid employees. As a result, they can readily be swung behind one or another political faction of the new nomenklatura-mafia bourgeoisie.
The results of "lumpenisation" also include a readiness to accept authoritarian rule, something which Yeltsin has long understood and exploited. A further element of the syndrome is crude Russian chauvinism, which Stalin and his successors preserved and fostered.
To the heritage of Stalinism, there has now been added the baneful experience of Yeltsin's 1993 campaign to destroy the old constitutional order. Whatever the fine phrases about "democratic reform", what Russians actually witnessed last year was a drawn-out struggle to undermine representative government, extending to the open violation of the constitution and the unlawful suspension of the Constitutional Court, and culminating in the indelible image of the smoke-blackened facade of the parliament building.
If millions of Russians on December 12 showed a horrifying readiness to accept the use by the state of violent and arbitrary methods, the blame does not lie exclusively with figures like Stalin and Brezhnev; Yeltsin must accept his share.
Hard-line nationalist candidates went into the elections knowing that "lumpenised" elements of the working class provided them with a solid constituency of potential supporters. In the early stages of campaigning, the best-known force bidding for nationalist support was the Russian All-People's Union, led by Sergei Baburin.
However, Baburin's party was excluded from the ballot after electoral officials, in a questionable decision, disallowed many of the signatures which the party submitted in an effort to qualify. Votes which would have gone to the Russian All-People's Union flowed to the LDP, helping to transform a minor party into a mass force.
There were, of course, large numbers of Russians who were disillusioned with the pro-Yeltsin "democrats" but who were quite unattracted to the nationalist ultra-right. Among female voters who turned against Yeltsin, the centrist Women of Russia bloc was a popular choice. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and its close allies, the Agrarian Party, made an unexpectedly strong showing with a combined total of about 20% of the party-list vote.
The fact remains, however, that the failure of hard-line capitalist economics in Russia did not bring about a pronounced shift to the left. Clearly, a large part of the reason was that the only party of the Russian left to win ballot status was the CPRF. For huge numbers of Russians, including many hostile to the government, the identification of the CPRF with the crimes of the Soviet era rules it out as an acceptable alternative.
A bloc of left forces independent of the Communist Party would probably not have taken large numbers of votes from the LDP. But it would have provided an attractive alternative for large numbers of people who in the event stayed away from the polling stations. In these circumstances, the left might well have scored strongly enough to overshadow the successes of the nationalist right.
Opinion surveys continue to show that large numbers of Russians, close to a majority, remain sympathetic to the values and goals of socialism. Meanwhile, the privatisation of large-scale industry - the core of the liberal program - is heavily unpopular.
Adherents of the non-communist left were in fact elected in various territorial districts, and will probably form a bloc of about 10 deputies in the new parliament.
There was nothing preordained about the failure of these forces to achieve ballot status in the party-list vote. Their absence from the all-Russian poll was the result mainly of Yeltsin's success in intimidating opposition trade unions, on which the non-communist left would have had to rely for organisational support. After consolidating his coup against the old parliament, the president issued veiled but unmistakable threats that Russia's main trade union federation would be dissolved, and its property confiscated, if it dared to meddle in politics.
Other problems of Russia's non-communist left have included a failure to devote adequate attention to the tasks of party organisation.
In the case of the largest group, the Socialist Party of Workers (SPT), the central problem has been a deep political confusion that reflects an inability to come to grips with the phenomenon of Stalinism and with the reasons for the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. During the campaign period, the SPT committed a series of disastrous blunders that included adopting a sectarian attitude to the CPRF and forming an opportunistic bloc with nationalist and pro-capitalist forces.
In formal terms, the process of electing a new Russian parliament culminated on January 12, when the new legislature held its inaugural session. In practice, the changes to the mechanisms of rule that have operated in recent months will be strikingly few. Since September Yeltsin has ruled by decree, and in large measure he will continue to do so; under his new constitution, the rights of the parliament are tightly circumscribed.
However, Russia's political dynamics will now be perceptibly different. The parliament will not have power, but it will be an excellent sounding-board. This will ensure that the dominant figure within the Russian nationalist movement will no longer be the relatively tame Baburin, who on various questions has steered close to the Communist Party, but the erratic and vehemently pro-capitalist Zhirinovsky.
During 1994 mass unemployment in Russia will become a reality. As the social degradation of the population proceeds, Zhirinovsky will be well placed to expand his party on a social basis close to that of traditional Western fascism. For the present, he is developing his links with ultraright groups in Germany and other countries, and making a vigorous effort to stay in the media limelight.
The situation now unfolding on the far right of Russian politics is extraordinarily dangerous. If Zhirinovsky is to be denied his goal of winning the presidency in 1996, his opponents need a deliberate strategy; haphazard reactions to the LDP's initiatives will not be enough.
A basic principle is that the forces around Yeltsin - forces which, by any normal reckoning, are also part of the extreme right - cannot be relied on to lead a struggle against Zhirinovsky. As explained, Yeltsin himself bears an important degree of responsibility for the LDP's successes.
The "broad anti-fascist front" urged by first deputy premier Yegor Gaidar would bind participating forces to policies which in practice would very likely aid Zhirinovsky's party. Gaidar's proposal must be rejected in favour of unity around policies which genuinely defend the workers and poor.
A further principle is that the forces which oppose the anti-democratic nationalist Zhirinovsky must place their stake uncompromisingly on democracy and internationalism. A good way to begin attacking fascism in Russia would be to organise protest actions against the vicious anti-foreigner offensive being waged by the liberal mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov.
Yeltsin's attacks on democracy must not be spared either. After his election setback, the president claimed that by restricting the powers of the parliament, his new constitution provided a bulwark against fascism. The truth is the exact opposite.
Yeltsin has placed Zhirinovsky in a demagogue's heaven. The LDP now has a prominent voice, but in a powerless assembly, is in no danger of being discredited by the failure of its ideas. Winning genuine power for the representative branch of government would place the parliament's pro-capitalist majority - including the LDP - in the position of having to account for capitalism's failures. Zhirinovsky's popularity would be unlikely to last.
Whatever the pressures from Yeltsin, the trade unions must reject the illusion that they can or should stay out of political life. If Yeltsin wants to persecute trade unions for sponsoring workers' anti-fascist committees, let him try. If the LDP takes to organising physical attacks on its opponents, the left and labour movements must join in organising the direct defence of democratic and human rights. The key strategy here must be efforts to mobilise the great majority of the population who oppose fascism.
Zhirinovsky's LDP is already a powerful adversary. However, anti-fascist organisations in the West have had considerable success in curbing the influence of similar formations. In Russia, the work of monitoring the LDP's actions, and of countering its propaganda, must begin immediately.
[From Russian Labour Review.]