Jenny Francis, Kabul
Washington has a dream: following a large turnout at the polls in Afghanistan on October 9, US-backed interim president Hamid Karzai will win free and fair elections, and US President George Bush will claim credit for bringing democracy to the country, only three years after ousting the Taliban, and just in time for the US presidential election.
With security and governability throughout Afghanistan deteriorating, this scenario is possible, but it is looking increasingly doubtful.
I met with local staff of Afghan non-government organisations (NGOs) and international aid workers in Kabul in July to discuss the reasons behind the deteriorating security situation. These workers almost unanimously blamed the key, foreign-funded, UN-implemented "campaigns", especially the coming presidential elections.
US timeline for elections
The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 established a "roadmap" and timetable for peace and security in Afghanistan. This agreement stipulated that a transitional authority would govern the country until such time as a fully representative government would be elected through free and fair elections by June 2004.
On July 9, after two deferrals, which the Afghan government blamed on "Taliban-led insurgents and slow progress in disarming warlords", the date of the country's first direct presidential elections was re-set for October 9. The more problematic parliamentary elections were further delayed until May or June next year.
Most people I met agreed that state institutions are incapable of providing the required safe environment for an election. So why the rush? The highly regarded Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), explained: "There is a widely held perception that this enthusiasm for 2004 elections is a result of the Bush administration's need for a foreign policy and 'war-on-terror' success ahead of the November 2004 presidential elections in the US, particularly as Iraq appears to be coming less of a success by the day".
Many also believe that the promise of elections is the "hook" to keep non-US military forces and international donors from pulling out of Afghanistan.
The AREU is understandably concerned that "elections marred by widespread intimidation and irregularities will be regarded as illegitimate by both Afghans and the international community".
Voter registration
Voter registration is being implemented by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), largely funded by the US and Britain, at a cost of nearly US$100 million.
The Taliban, which is growing in strength, has vowed to thwart the elections. Its daily attacks on voter registration has killed 650 people so far, including several foreigners. Seventeen men were killed in June, supposedly because they were carrying voter registration cards.
The Afghan women willing to talk to me openly about the issue told me they would not register, nor vote, because, "it's just too risky". They lived in Kabul, where voter security will supposedly be "guaranteed" by NATO's omnipresent International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
The UN rates 169 of the country's 361 territories as medium or high risk. Much of this area is off limits to UN staff. UNDP admits that "due to financial, logistical and security constraints the registration exercise could not be expanded to the provinces, as originally scheduled".
Security is not the only thing hampering the voter registration process. In many areas, particularly in the south, socio-cultural factors stop women from registering. Even if the current UN estimate that 40% of registrations are women is correct, there needs to be substantial progress in reversing women's restricted mobility and participation in public life, their lack of access to information and their dismal literacy levels (21%), to ensure anything resembling equal access to the electoral process.
It is difficult to believe the highly publicised registration count. Last week, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana rang Karzai to congratulate him on his choice of running mate for the election and commend him on the voter registration level — supposedly 7.5 million out of the estimated 10 million eligible voters. With the country still in ruins, 180,000 displaced persons and more than 2 million refugees in the surrounding region, all of whom are eligible to vote, such a figure is implausible.
US-backed candidates
Transitional president Karzai comes from an influential, southern Afghan family of Pashtun origin. He funnelled arms and funds to mujaheddin, and is a former supporter of the Taliban, before he turned on it at the behest of his US backers.
He is also a former consultant to Unocol, the gas consortium that is planning to build a trans-Afghanistan pipeline to carry oil and natural gas from Central Asia's Caspian Sea to open water ports in the Indian Ocean.
On July 25, Karzai surprised the country — and caused ISAF forces to go on high alert — by announcing his running mate for the elections.
When the urbane, Western-educated Karzai — Washington's choice — was nominated as president of the transitional authority, the understanding was that the Northern Alliance commanders would take many of the posts, including national minister and provincial governors.
Many of these, including northern forces commander and deputy defence minister General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Herat Governor Ismail Khan, Kandahar Governor Gul Agha Sherzai, and vice-president Karim Khalili, continue to command private armies whose loyalty is to them before the central government.
Khan, for example, known as the Lion of Herat, commands between 20,000 and 30,0000 troops. When his son was killed by the Afghanistan National Army, he routed that army from Herat. These men, all renowned killers, largely govern the country.
Perhaps the most significant is Afghanistan's defence minister, General Mohammad Qasim Fahim, who, besides having responsibility for the Afghanistan National Army, also continues to command one of the country's largest private militias. As a powerful Northern Alliance commander, a Tajik, and current defence minister, it was assumed, until this recent announcement, that he would be Karzai's vice- presidential running mate. This would have formed the strong combination in the ticket of educated and warlord, Pashtun and Tajik and southern and northern.
However, Karzai's surprise announcement was to drop Fahim as running mate and choose Ahmed Zia Massoud, currently Afghanistan's ambassador to Russia. Massoud is best known as the brother of Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was killed in 2001, and whose face, sometimes 10 metres tall, now adorns buildings throughout the country.
After this announcement, the country braced itself for the response of the powerful defence minister. The ISAF was on high alert, and the UN advised its staff to keep low for several days. The response was, in fact, quite swift. Education minister Yunus Quanooni immediately announced his candidacy for president, claiming the support of Fahim, as well as foreign minister Abdullah. Until Karzai's announcement, this group represented his key supporters in the interim administration. It now represents his main challenge in the elections.
It is likely that the EU, which is promoting a campaign to demobilise the militia, pressured Karzai to drop Fahim, fearing that a renowned killer with a private army may not portray the best image as the new vice president of a "democratic" Afghanistan.
Samina Ahmed, of the International Crisis Group, points out that the pressure to drop Fahim is unlikely to have come from the US, because "the US works with militias on the ground". Yet, the New York Times, in an editorial on July 28, praised Karzai's decision and urged Washington to "repay his courage with military support if necessary".
This unexpected situation has created a dilemma for the US administration. Fahim, Quanooni and Abdullah formed the core leadership of the Northern Alliance militia, who helped US forces oust the Taliban. They have received cash, weapons, uniforms and communications equipment, both during and after the war against the Taliban. The US admitted to arming local warlords as late as October 2002. With Karzai's decision, they have now been effectively sidelined, and they are not happy.
I found that many average Afghans are not happy either. A common view is that ISAP and the UN are not concerned about the security and well being of Afghans, but of pushing their own agendas and protecting their own people. The head of one well-known NGO said, "There has been no real change for Afghans in these last few years, and NATO forces and the UN only focuses on the embassies."
As the October presidential elections approach, this view that Afghans are not setting the agenda for their country, combined with the lack of any real improvement in their lives, is frustrating and alienating more and more of them. And Bush's dream scenario may well not come true.
From 91×ÔÅÄÂÛ̳ Weekly, August 18, 2004.
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