After a 7.7 magnitude earthquake , the country’s military and the myriad resistance groups faced . A pause in the fighting would enable vital aid to enter the major quake zones and allow rescuers to assist victims in a disaster that has already .
The first to heed the call was the opposition National Unity Government, which unilaterally on attacks by its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force, on March 29. The — a coalition of three ethnic resistance groups: the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army — likewise agreed to a temporary truce.
But Myanmar’s military demurred. Just hours after the quake, as rescuers continued to dig through rubble in search of survivors, the generals ordered airstrikes on enemy positions and — a decision that United Nations as “nothing short of incredible.”
The generals eventually yielded to pressure late on April 2 — some five days after the earthquake hit — announcing that they would . But the statement appeared to be hollow, with reports just a day later that the military’s in Kachin state in Myanmar’s north.
As an of Myanmar, I believe the behaviour of the country’s military is of no surprise. The generals who have had a grip on the country have a track record of for political gain. Weakened by years of entrenched civil war, they are now to rehabilitate their image overseas, while consolidating power at home.
From disasters to elections
Myanmar’s ruling junta has tried this tactic before. In 2008, a week after the deadly cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, the military proceeded to hold that would guarantee the military’s control of government by reserving 25% of all parliamentary seats for officers while requiring 75% of votes for any future constitutional reform. It also allowed for the “in the event of an emergency.”
The referendum took place while much of Myanmar was still reeling from disaster, yet the junta announced a of the new pro-military constitution.
It paved the way to elections in 2010, which the military’s . Though that vote was boycotted by the opposition National League for Democracy, or NLD, Washington had by then signaled a shift in policy toward “pragmatic engagement” with the then-ruling junta. This US shift forced the recalcitrant NLD to cooperate in subsequent elections, giving legitimacy to a process that was stacked in favour of the generals.
Using a fig leaf of legitimacy
The latest disaster comes as the junta is again . Just a day before the earthquake, Myanmar’s military chief, Min Aung Hlaing, and called on opposition parties to participate.
But the proposed election in Myanmar is widely seen as a face-saving strategy for both the Myanmar military and, I would argue, an international community that has done little of any significance to end the civil war. In this context, elections would allow the generals to cover their 2021 power grab with .
The entrenched civil war that was sparked by that military takeover — a coup that ended a 10-year experiment with limited democracy — derailed the military’s initial plan to return to full control of the country.
Four years of fighting a broad-based opposition that includes ethnic minority groups like the Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Army, Arakan Army, Ta'ang National Liberation Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, People’s Defense Force and Bamar People’s Liberation Army has taken its toll on the military.
It has lost in many regions to the myriad resistance groups. Internationally, it has become more , and its largest trading partner, China, concerned over instability on its border, has slowed investments as it tries to play all sides of the conflict.
In desperation, the generals have resorted to for foot soldiers, while looking to for arms and investment.
The failure of the generals
What the military desperately needs now is a lifeline and a civil war exit plan. The earthquake could provide both, with a ceasefire — no matter how badly observed — providing a cover for allowing for a national vote.
But as has been evident in the days surrounding the announcement of a truce, the military is likely to exploit the disaster to weaken the resistance along the way. It has said that it will against any resistance group found to be regrouping or attacking the state during the ceasefire. Yet it has reportedly continued its own offensive.
The earthquake has revealed the failures and brutalities of the military in other ways, too. In the aftermath of the disaster, the military in badly hit Mandalay for allegedly employing rebel doctors and nurses who were treating members of the resistance. As it was, many have been in hiding since the coup, and young people who could have been on the front lines of relief efforts have either joined the resistance groups or fled the country.
The earthquake will also further hurt a Myanmar business community already suffering from the after the 2021 coup.
On unsecure foundations
Yet, the military may be hoping that it can use the disaster to rebuild its brand overseas. The surprise announcement of a ceasefire by the generals is part of that process. So, too, is the decision to , after initially . It is the military’s way of showing willingness to cooperate with the wider world.
In short, disaster diplomacy has kicked in for Myanmar’s military, as it did after 2008’s Cyclone Nagris. That earlier cyclone provided an opportunity for the junta to present a different face to the international community. Elections were held, not once, but twice — encouraged by the US and others — and investments rushed into Myanmar as the country was touted as “.
But the foundations of military-backed reform in Myanmar were built on fault lines that cracked and crumbled amid the 2021 coup. The military’s exploitation of the 2025 earthquake will, I fear, result in similar ends.
[Republished from under a Creative Commons license. Tharaphi Than is an Associate Professor of World Cultures and Languages at Northern Illinois University.]