President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an鈥檚 Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered a historic defeat in Turkey鈥檚 local elections that even they could not spin as a victory.
Following the AKP鈥檚 loss of the three biggest economic centres of Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara, Erdo臒an鈥檚 balcony speech sounded defeated and defensive.
How did this happen? What role was, and will be played by the country鈥檚 main leftist coalition party, the People鈥檚 Democratic Party (HDP)?
The opposition and the government
As in previous elections, the AKP-MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) coalition government utilised electoral fraud, suppression and media manipulation, all enabled and legitimised by the undemocratic political norms of Turkey, to shore up as much of a win as it could.
In the case of 艦谋rnak, a solidly Kurdish and pro-HDP province, the AKP somehow 鈥渢riumphed鈥 while surrounding provinces were won by the HDP.
The reason for this result lies with the mass displacement of civilians by urban warfare, and the bussing in of soldiers to vote for the AKP-MHP candidate.
With a government willing and able to go to such lengths to protect its hold on power, how did they lose at all?
Two factors lie behind this, the first objective and the second subjective.
The objective factor lies in Turkey鈥檚 deep economic crisis, which has already caused severe poverty and unemployment and is expected to last at least two years.
The neoliberal policies of the AKP and its capitalist-Islamist predecessors stretch back to the era of Turgut 脰zal in the 1980s. With so many of Turkey鈥檚 resources being bought and sold by multinational firms, a truly corrupt oligarchy has left Turkish people, particularly in major cities, literally starving.
In response to AKP rule, worker resistance has reached a new high point 鈥 from the resistance of airport workers, to the women workers of Flormar, and now to the Kale Kay谋艧 factory workers, whose struggle is still ongoing.
In one month, as many Turkish workers die in workplace incidents as in a year in Australia. Occasionally, self-immolations by workers demanding pay and justice light up social media, but these incidents are suppressed by the AKP-dominated mainstream media.
The March 8 International Women鈥檚 Day march was vilified as an affront to Islamic values and the marchers were falsely portrayed as attacking Islam, offending millions of women across Turkey.
Under such conditions, Turkish people are really and truly fed up with the AKP, and post-election street interviews reveal jaded former AKP voters who cannot wait to see the AKP go.
According to the rule of law, (which applies in Turkey only when there is a challenge to the status quo, never when the state wishes to enact fascistic violence), this sentiment must be expressed via the ballot box.
To avoid splitting the vote of 鈥渢he opposition鈥, the HDP did not stand candidates in majority Turkish areas, running only in the Kurdish provinces where it is strongest.
Thus a kind of 鈥渁nti-AKP鈥 front was able to form, representing the people鈥檚 resentment. It was this resentment that won the day, not the appeal of the hodgepodge of values 鈥渞epresented鈥 by the CHP (which vacillates between Turkish nationalism and social democracy).
The result was clear: despite the fraud and the banning of HDP election propaganda from television, the local elections delivered several key victories to the HDP in the Kurdish provinces, and the CHP-led coalition in the rest of the country.
Under more democratic conditions the result would have been a more resounding defeat for the AKP-MHP alliance.
Fear of association with 鈥渢errorism鈥 prevented CHP leader Kemal K谋l谋莽daro臒lu from even mentioning the name of the party that had most contributed to tipping the scales against the AKP-led government. However, the opposition came together to reclaim Istanbul as they last did at Gezi Park in May 2013.
Istanbul and Gezi
The loss of Istanbul is much worse for the AKP than the loss of Ankara. Istanbul鈥檚 huge population and the level of capital investment in the city make it an irreplaceable loss.
Turkey cannot be ruled from the rural provinces, but it could be ruled from Istanbul alone and the AKP-MHP coalition continues to contest the Istanbul result. The results in Istanbul were more favourable to the opposition this time, compared to the last general election, when accusations of fraud were leveled against the AKP. How could the opposition have stolen their most prized possession, Istanbul, from right under their noses?
The AKP鈥檚 one concern is protecting the ruling clique for as long as possible, rather than its believability. The AKP spent the run-up to the election cynically exploiting the victims of the Christchurch terrorist attack. For years it used control of the mainstream media to declaim (with no objection from the state-backed clerics) that God is on its side and the opposition is part of a terrorist plot spanning from the nationalist CIA-backed cleric Fethullah G眉len to the Wahhabi jihadist group ISIS, to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
The AKP knows that losing Istanbul means the beginning of the end. It means municipal government resources will be in the hands of an opposition that won its seat in power based on a broad popular front, an alliance between the more democratic elements of the CHP and the leftist and pro-Kurdish HDP.
To surrender Istanbul to the opposition means to admit defeat to the process that began at Gezi.
The opposition has created its own mythology from the heroic resistance at Gezi. CHP mayoral candidate for Istanbul, Ekrem 陌mamo臒lu, was greeted after his victory by adoring voters celebrating his : 鈥淲e will build Istanbul鈥檚 biggest park. For Berkin, for our children.鈥
Berkin Elvan was a 15-year-old who was killed by police during the Gezi Park protests. Erdo臒an cynically washed his hands of this act, declaring the boy a 鈥渢errorist鈥. He became an instant symbol of the AKP鈥檚 cruelty towards children, even outside of the war zone in the Kurdish provinces.
The era of hope that Gezi would find its reflection in the ballot box has come to a close, and a new period in Turkish politics has begun. Cities will become centres of opposition as never before. The media will become less unilateral. The opposition will become more united and resolute. The wave of change initiated by the historic March 31 elections will proceed in diverse ways. The HDP will play its role as the major popular left-wing force and leader of the democratic movement in Turkey.
The HDP鈥檚 difficult tasks
Herein lies the limitation of the local electoral victory: it was not an AKP mayor who killed Berkin Elvan or the other Gezi martyrs, but the state security forces.
The security of the Turkish state is still handled by appointed governors, who will hold back the anti-government movement, however possible, using whatever means they deem fit.
Their capacity remains to replace elected officials if they can be jailed on flimsy 鈥渢errorism鈥 pretexts. The HDP won back 70 of 102 offices seized by AKP-appointed 鈥渢rustees鈥 under such pretexts. More would have been won, were it not for the stolen election in 艦谋rnak.
The damage done since the previous local elections was significant and the finances of municipalities degenerated severely under the trustees.
In impoverished Kurdish provinces, the plunder of resources led to heavy debt and municipal buildings were "gifted" to state institutions. Newly elected HDP officials have the difficult task of repairing the trustees鈥 damage and constructing a genuine, popular, local democracy.
Erdo臒an鈥檚 government will not sit idly by while Kurdish politicians set about this work. It will likely actively intervene with a new wave of repression against the Kurdish popular movement and try to castigate the HDP for its defeat. This will place the ever-skittish CHP in the position of having to choose between doing the right thing and avoiding association with Turkey鈥檚 favourite scapegoat 鈥 a test they have rarely passed before.
The HDP鈥檚 mission going forward is clear: not to wait years for the next general election, which may not even happen if the AKP does not allow the legal democratic process to continue.
The progressive forces that stand behind the HDP 鈥 the heroic Kurdish people, the socialist left, the feminists, the ecologists and the LGBTI movement 鈥 face a revival of the 鈥淕ezi spirit鈥. Whatever votes the HDP gathers for itself or for the broad opposition, it gathers in the name of these forces, which have proven by the result in Istanbul to be so powerful when united that they forced the AKP to back down, however temporarily, from its unbelievable claims.
The HDP鈥檚 task is now to put forward the most 鈥渦nbelievable鈥 claim of all: that the peoples of Turkey can unite, bring down a faltering dictator, and pose a real, popular democratic alternative. One that will answer all the questions about the future of Turkish society laid bare during Gezi.
[Alp Alt谋n枚rs is a former deputy co-chair of the HDP, and with Muhsin Yorulmaz is a writer and translator with , a Marxist internet magazine.]