Sarah Glynn reviews the week鈥檚 extraordinary events in Syria and examines the evolution and nature of Hay始at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), whose forces have charged through the hollowed-out shell of Bashar al Assad鈥檚 regime and potentially beyond the control of Turkey鈥檚 President Recep Tayyip Erdo臒an.
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Last week saw the emergence of two linked, but different, campaigns in Syria. HTS has been leading the campaign against the weakened and demoralised forces of the Syrian government.
The other campaign is being undertaken by Islamist militias that act as Turkey鈥檚 mercenaries and make up what Turkey has named the Syrian National Army (SNA). In line with Turkish aims, they are focussed on attacking the Kurds and destroying the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. To make it more confusing, some SNA militias are fighting alongside HTS.
December 1
Last Sunday, faced with the prospect of an all-out attack by the SNA backed by Turkey, the Autonomous Administration announced a general mobilisation. Worrying news began to arrive from the isolated exclave of al Shahba, where the families displaced by Turkey鈥檚 2018 invasion of Afr卯n had found shelter. Despite cut communications, reports came out of attacks on civilians and random killings. The SNA had the area under siege and people were huddled in the cold waiting for safe passage out.
December 2
On Monday, Masloum Abdi, Commander in Chief of the Autonomous Administration鈥檚 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), announced that they had failed in their attempt to open a humanitarian corridor, but they were working on arrangements for a safe evacuation. The first batch of displaced people arrived in the relative safety of Tabqa that day, but some of those still in Shahba were being arrested by the SNA and SNA fighters were sharing videos of themselves beating and abusing arrested Kurds.
In Turkey, members of the pro-Kurdish DEM Party were detained for protesting against Turkey鈥檚 attacks in Syria.
December 3
On Tuesday, Erdo臒an鈥檚 far-right ally Devlet Bah莽eli declared that Aleppo 鈥渋s Turkish and Muslim to its very marrow鈥. Meanwhile tensions were developing between HTS and the SNA. HTS arrested some SNA members for looting, and took over some areas captured by the SNA, and they announced that the SNA would have no part in the governance of Aleppo.
HTS put the two autonomous Kurdish neighbourhoods of Aleppo, Sheikh Maqsoud and al Ashrafiyeh under blockade, but was negotiating with the SDF rather than attacking.
About 75,000 people had been moved from Shahba to Tabqa and Raqqa where they were squeezed into temporary camps, schools and sports halls.
SNA forces were reported moving towards Manbij, the first part of the main Autonomous area that they are expected to attack.
In Deir ez-Zor, the Deir ez-Zor Military Council 鈥 part of the SDF 鈥 took control of seven villages from the Syrian government and Iran-backed militias. They explained that this was done to prevent ISIS taking over, and at the request of local people. The action was supported by US air strikes, and because this is a largely Arab area the local Military Council is also largely Arab.
The US Department of Defence Spokesperson, when asked by a Turkish journalist if the US would protect the Kurds, dodged the question, repeating their standard formula that their focus is on defeating ISIS.
December 4
On Wednesday, with evacuations from Shahba continuing, Heyva Sora Kurdistan锚 (Kurdish Red Crescent), launched an , and the Autonomous Administration called on the United Nations to open the Al-Yaarubiyah border crossing, closed in 2019, for aid. The SDF reported large-scale kidnapping of IDPs by the SNA in Shahba. It was learnt that the International Coalition against ISIS had helped secure the evacuation with continuous fights overhead, but rescue buses were still being blocked.
SNA forces were made to leave Aleppo.
December 5
On Thursday, the Syrian city of Hama fell to HTS.
As the Syrian government forces collapsed, ISIS took advantage of the power vacuum to take control of strategic areas in the Syrian Desert that occupies a large swathe of the country between Homs in the west and Deir ez-Zor in the east. The SDF made clear that they would move to prevent ISIS from enlarging their control and repeating the dangers of 2014.
At least 85,000 people had now reached the main Autonomous region from Shahba, but about 15,000 were still trapped. One-hundred-and-twenty vehicles full of fleeing families had been taken by the SNA and their fate was unknown. Some people had been kidnapped and taken to Turkish occupied Afr卯n. Some had died from the cold. More reports kept arriving of kidnaps, arrests, murders, robberies, violence and abuse. There is a shortage of everything that people need, including places to sleep.
There were reports of Turkish shelling and clashes near Manbij.
In Turkey, DEM Party MPs held a sit-in in Parliament to protest the attacks and also the replacement of elected mayors with trustees.
December 6
On Friday, Homs fell to HTS, and the Syrian government forces pulled back from more and more places, including Deir ez-Zor city, which was taken over by the SDF along with other areas towards Raqqa. The SDF also took over the government pockets in Qamishli and Hasaka. The Autonomous Administration now controls about 40% of Syria.
Anti-government forces took control of Suwayda, and Daraa in the south.
Speaking to reporters after Friday prayers, that this wasn鈥檛 the situation that he had anticipated. At first, he was positive: 鈥淭he opposition鈥檚 march is continuing at this moment. We are following this closely, both through intelligence and media sources. Our wish is that this march continues without a hitch.鈥 But then, 鈥淎s you may recall, we called on Assad to meet with us. We suggested that we come together and determine Syria鈥檚 future. Unfortunately, we did not receive a positive response from Assad. Idlib is already done. Hama and Homs are also at the hands of the opposition. Now an advancement towards Damascus is in question. Overall, these troubled marches going on in the region are not what we desire. Our hearts do not wish for this.鈥
HTS
But what exactly is HTS, and who is its PR-savvy leader? Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani was sent to Syria by the Islamic State in Iraq in 2012 to establish a branch of the organisation there. He founded Jabhat ul-Nusra, which, the following year, shifted their allegiance to al Qaeda. In 2015, they were part of an alliance that gained control of the Idlib region in Syria鈥檚 northwest, and formally broke with al-Qaeda to rebrand as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. They came together with other groups in 2017 to form HTS, which, through a combination of force and guile, became the dominant power in Idlib.
HTS seized control of most of the remaining parts of the Idlib region in early 2019, and in the last two years they have used a combination of alliances and military attacks to expand their control over areas occupied by Turkey and controlled by SNA groups.
The US and Turkey branded HTS a terrorist organisation in 2018. That autumn, Turkey sent troops to defend Idlib against attacks by Russia and the Syrian government, which resulted in an agreement between Russia and Turkey that included the dissolution of HTS. But that agreement never held.
Having failed to attract fighters away from HTS towards their own sponsored groups, Turkey was left to make deals with the pragmatist wing of HTS. Turkey has provided Idlib with military protection, and has supplied HTS with arms and ammunition, but HTS controlled large amounts of territory, including oil wells and the lucrative Bab al-Hawa border crossing, and was powerful enough to retain significant autonomy.
Turkey formally intervened against a major Russian-backed Syrian government advance into Idlib in 2020, resulting in an intermittently broken ceasefire agreement.
Turkey has had to rely increasingly on HTS because their own SNA militias have proved too unruly and fractious to achieve their aims, but they have given succour to an organisation that they cannot control.
The success of al Jawlani and HTS has been based on a ruthless drive for power combined with a recognition of the importance of organisation and discipline, and a deep pragmatism. This has allowed HTS to absorb or destroy rival groups, and to control and administer a region 鈥 Idlib 鈥 that now houses about three million people. It has allowed them to develop a symbiotic relationship with Turkey; and is currently enabling them to carry out a well-prepared and effective military campaign, coordinated with diplomacy. Military planning was combined with cultivation of support within Syria鈥檚 cities, and a PR campaign to persuade the world that HTS are the 鈥渕oderate鈥 rebels that politicians dream about.
HTS have not stepped back from their hardline Islamist beliefs. In Idlib, their Syrian Salvation Government follows an Islamist program, and their recent history includes strict 鈥渕oral鈥 policing, prevention of gender mixing and floggings. They have crushed all opposition to their control.
on the organisation noted that 鈥渁rbitrary detention, torture, and summary executions in secret prisons, suppression of dissent, religious discrimination, and gender violence have been defining characteristics of HTS鈥 rule鈥. And they described HTS as running a 鈥渃overt authoritarian regime鈥.
But pragmatism requires more accommodating methods 鈥 at least outwardly and for the time being. Grandiose visions are tempered by an approach that might be described as Islamism in one country, and their administration strives to fulfil basic needs and build local support. HTS have long been trying to soften their image in the West 鈥 to lose their terrorism label and win a place in negotiations for a future Syria 鈥 and they have been diplomatically and tactically calling for mutual coexistence of different peoples and religions. Many have pointed out that the Taliban also claimed to have reformed before they came back into power, though the situations are very different.
Yesterday, al-Jawlani gave a to CNN where he stressed the importance of institutionalism and discipline to his success, and the need for 鈥渋nstitutional governance鈥. He attempted to present his ISIS roots as youthful folly and spoke about the need for a legal framework to ensure rights for all. But he also claimed that people who fear Islamic governance don鈥檛 understand it properly.
This approach contrasts sharply with that of most of the SNA groups directly sponsored by Turkey 鈥 and this contrast itself has helped create a positive perception of HTS, who are now able to use the disciplining of SNA looters and troublemakers as an excuse to exclude them from control in the places they have captured. Many reports from the Turkish-occupied areas that are in day-to-day charge of SNA groups have testified to their predilection for pillage and abduction for ransom, and for extreme sadistic violence. The reports that are now reaching us of the abuse of people trying to escape from al-Shahba are sadly unsurprising.
The war behind closed doors
Events on the ground are only part of the story. Another war has been taking place behind closed doors in cities such as Ankara, Moscow, Washington and Doha. International powers are competing for strategic advantage and shares in the spoils, and the people of the region 鈥 especially the Kurds and the Syrian refugees in Turkey 鈥 are often treated merely as bargaining chips, plus 鈥 in the case of the Kurds 鈥 useful frontline troops in the fight against ISIS.
These meetings long preceded current events, and an important aim of Turkey鈥檚 attacks was to strengthen their hand in any negotiations. The Newlines Institute (which receives US government funding) has written a detailed account of the bargaining that had been going on between Turkey, Syria and Russia up to this date, which is very plausible, though they give no sources for their story. They concluded 鈥淣egotiations are presently underway, and they aim at achieving what matters most to Turkey. These are eliminating the Kurdish presence on the Syrian border, along with all elements of statehood set up by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); returning Syrian refugees from Turkey without harassment or arrest by Syrian authorities; and maintaining a permanent security corridor for the Turks along the entire border strip, 22 miles deep.鈥
Turkey is now in a strong position to get all three, which it鈥檚 been bartering over, via the Russians, for the past seven years. They could also have added the realisation of Ataturk鈥檚 1920 National Pact (Misak-谋 Mill卯), which envisaged Turkish control over all non-Arab areas. Erdo臒an was still calling on Assad to engage in dialogue on Thursday, but now all these plans appear to have been overtaken by events.
For the US, Israel and their loyal allies, the main consideration is containing Iran and disrupting the Shia Crescent linking Iran and Palestine. For Russia, the most important place in Syria is the city of Tartus, where they have their only Mediterranean naval base. They will also not welcome the loss of prestige that comes from being seen to be defeated.
However, as , Russian air strikes would be of little use when the Syrian army is not actually fighting on the ground. Iran would want to prop up Assad, and so maintain their Shia links and Syrian assets, but they have been restricted not only by Israel鈥檚 attacks on their proxies, but also by the risk of provoking more attacks on themselves from Israel or the US.
The Autonomous Administration also takes a pragmatic approach. This is necessary to preserve lives. They will talk to whoever might be able to pacify the situation. SDF Commander in Chief Mazloum Abdi told a press conference in Hasakah yesterday, 鈥淲e have enough forces to deter any Turkish aggression in our areas,鈥 but that 鈥渨hat matters to us is protecting our areas and resolving issues with Turkey peacefully. We want to reduce tensions with Turkey through Russian and American mediation.鈥
He stated that they are in communication with all parties; that they are in ongoing discussions with HTS concerning the Sheikh Maqsoud and al Ashrafieh neighbourhoods in Aleppo; that the evacuation of al Shahba had been assisted by an agreement between the US and HTS; and that they are cooperating with the US-dominated International Coalition to confront the growing threats from ISIS. At the same time, they know they must be very wary.
We can also be sure that Turkey is attempting negotiations with Abdullah 脰calan in 陌mral谋 prison, but the nature of Turkey鈥檚 offer can only be guessed.
[Abridged from . Sarah Glynn is a writer and activist 鈥 visit her and follow her on or .]